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Virtuous Character
for the Practice of Law
Research Report
‘AT HIS BEST, MAN IS THE 
NOBLEST OF ALL ANIMALS; 
SEPARATED FROM LAW AND 
JUSTICE HE IS THE WORST.’
Aristotle
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Foreword
Professor Adrian Evans
This report offers welcome empirical support 
for virtue ethics as a promising contributor 
to character-driven legal education and 
morally-strengthened lawyers’ conduct. It is 
timely not just because of disquiet around 
lawyers’ ethics, but also because the need 
for a developed sense of character in all 
professions, is becoming urgent.
In the face of recent financial history, a general 
UK legislative ‘light touch’ approach to legal 
and business behaviours appears superbly 
naïve – or merely recognises the capture 
of government by some business interests. 
But while government capture and lack of will 
is not responsible for all failures in business 
and professional life, there remains an 
educational and regulatory space in which 
the individual character of our professionals 
can still play a role in strengthening social 
and political institutions. 
To date, the pre-emptive focus of virtue ethics 
has not been allowed sufficient opportunity to 
impact on unprofessional or unethical behaviours 
in any sector, except perhaps medicine. There 
can be no question that research of this nature 
helps to fill a critical need for confidence in the 
future of professional culture. In several sectors, 
but perhaps especially business and law, 
greed and corruption – whether ‘soft’, cultural 
and traditionally acceptable, or hard-nosed, 
organised and overtly criminal – are still 
supported by uncritical corporate cultures and 
ineffective codes of conduct. And importantly, 
none of this has a mere sectoral impact, 
because lawyers’ work affects every other 
sector. Is it too strong to claim that no immoral 
activity can be carried out and then covered up, 
without a lawyer involved somewhere? Is it 
too hard to imagine that many public and private 
efforts to improve global health and poverty, 
reduce human rights abuses, and address 
the linked phenomena of climate change 
and population pressure, are undermined as 
a result?
While this report does not assert that massive 
moral failure is yet evident among all lawyers, 
it does caution against complacency. Inside 
commercial legal practice, contemporary 
evidence of the GFC experience and limited 
or ineffective post-offence prosecutions by 
regulators are prominent indicators of an ethical 
vacuum within the integrated business–law 
sector. Law and lawyers have often facilitated 
many of these structural problems, for example, 
through securities lawyers’ improper packaging 
of mortgage debt to hide its volatile nature, 
and by protecting likely wrongdoing through 
overzealous client advocacy. Very often, law per 
se has failed to ensure effective governance 
and indeed, the Rule of Law; it is an internally 
sparring sector with its own politely contested, 
duty-based ethics and insufficient impact on the 
key antidotes to corruption: boosted integrity 
and a love of transparency. 
Many current strategies to improve behaviour 
are essentially consequentialist, in the sense 
that their success or failure is typically judged 
in terms of outcomes, though they may include 
some elements of Kantian concern for fairness 
and virtue ethics’ promotion of character 
strength through, for example, the concept 
of trust. And while there is some evidence that 
conventional ethical theory – consequentialism 
and Kantian ethics – can help to improve 
capacity to recognise and categorise a problem 
according to one of these two approaches, the 
adequacy of these theories to ethically charged 
situations is a continuous challenge in the 
absence of virtue – or character-building efforts. 
Conventionally, appropriate leadership, 
role-based ethics education and a concerted 
effort to reform social norms have been 
proposed as the remedy for inadequate or 
corrupt behaviours. These measures have been 
suggested for delivery through an ongoing 
partnership between civil society institutions, 
professional leaders and policy makers in an 
integrated governance approach. While these 
conjunctions are essential, they are unlikely 
to make enough of a difference to individuals’ 
behaviours unless the effects of character 
can be addressed and even measured.
When professionals’ and business behaviours 
are seen to be deficient, the instinctive first 
response of regulators is to propose additional 
ethics training by professional and occupational 
groups, and to impose theoretically harsher 
disciplinary consequences, with or without 
financial or custodial consequences. But so 
often, any increased training is itself minimal, 
defined only in hours of attendance, and is 
based on act-centred prescriptions rather than 
an integrated model of professional ideals with 
examples of virtuous leadership. This is as true 
inside the law as anywhere. If regular mandatory 
pre-emptive training is recommended and 
commenced, the educational goals and 
processes are generally pedestrian, rule-
focused and treated with weariness and some 
disdain by undergraduate students and 
practical legal trainees alike. 
Although there is growing evidence of the 
capacity of values-enhancing methodologies 
such as clinical legal education and much 
promise in techniques such as comparative 
ethical analysis, ethics education in law is often 
pedestrian, outsourced to private trainers who 
are concerned to maximise profit. Rarely is 
there any relevant assessment of participants’ 
learning outcomes, and certainly not of 
strengthened character attributes. 
This research from the Jubilee Centre begins 
to put virtue on the practice map for UK lawyers 
and does so with authority. Limitations of the 
survey design, identified in the report, are 
tangible and acknowledged, but they point to 
the need for further research rather than call for 
caution. Despite and perhaps because of these 
limits, some key results pointing to a possible 
lack of virtue in relation to billing and lawyers’ 
trust accounts are particularly disturbing. 
They broadly parallel prior findings elsewhere 
and serve to make the empirical case for 
further work and advocacy by the Centre. 
And optimism is justified. In the finding that the 
virtues of judgement, perseverance, perspective 
and fairness are rated highly by all who were 
surveyed, there is hope that efforts directed 
at strengthening these attributes, especially 
among law students and new lawyers, will add 
powerfully to moral resilience in the profession 
and the law.  
Descriptions of lawyers’ moral vulnerabilities 
canvassed in this report are not recited for mere 
scene-setting, but for decision and response. 
There is a compelling case to incorporate virtue 
ethics into legal ethics education and training 
and over time, to assess the impact in terms of 
each lawyer’s individual moral compass. 
Professor Adrian Evans
Monash University
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Executive Summary
There is growing evidence in Britain to 
suggest that virtues such as honesty, 
self-control, fairness and respect, which 
contribute to good moral character, may be 
part of the solution to many of the challenges 
facing society today. Until recently, the 
language of virtue and the importance of 
virtue-based behaviour have been neglected 
in Britain.
The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues 
aims to help remedy this situation. As a 
world-leader in rigorous academic research 
into applied virtue ethics, the Centre operates 
on the basis that good moral character is 
possible and practicable, and that businesses 
can operate better when behaving virtuously. 
The Jubilee Centre’s new report, Virtuous 
Character for the Practice of Law, sets about 
trying to examine the place of character 
and values in the legal profession in Britain. 
The report draws its findings from a UK-
focused survey of 966 lawyers1 and aspiring 
lawyers at varying stages of their careers. It is 
one of the largest pieces of research carried 
out in Britain focusing on issues of character 
and virtue within a specific industry sector.
The report explores:
 The motivations of those entering the 
legal profession;
 The moral virtues that are prized within the 
legal profession;
 How changes in the profession add to 
existing pressures on sustaining ethical 
practice in the workplace;
 The extent to which lawyers are equipped to 
handle ethical dilemmas within the 
workplace;
 Ethics education provided in law schools.
Key findings:
 The character strengths of judgement, 
perseverance, perspective and fairness 
were deemed most important in an ‘ideal’ 
lawyer by respondents across all career 
stages. Judgement and honesty were 
selected by 84% of solicitors and 93% 
of barristers. Fairness and perseverance 
appeared in the top six choices for 
respondents selecting both ideal qualities 
and personal qualities.
 Morality is viewed by the majority of 
respondents as being at the core of being a 
good lawyer. However, some respondents 
expressed concerns about moral standards 
in the profession as a whole, e.g. in relation 
to tax law. 
 Ethics education receives little attention 
in the curricula for undergraduate law 
students. At the vocational stage, ethics 
focuses narrowly on the application  
of professional codes of conduct.
 The vast majority of lawyers at all career 
stages indicated that they would perform 
dutifully in their responses to the ethical 
dilemmas. However, 16% of experienced 
solicitors indicated that they would take 
guidance from senior colleagues  
on ‘rounding up’ billing hours, even  
when it might be regarded as fraudulent.  
 The findings indicate some constraints 
and anxieties about the maintenance of a 
virtuous character in the practice of law. 
Commercial factors were most frequently 
cited by those in practice as pressures, 
but the positive influence of good role 
models was considered effective in helping 
to deal with them.
 The data collected indicate that virtue 
ethics, in combination with other ethical 
perspectives, provides a useful theoretical 
lens through which to explore the ethics 
of legal practice.
The report makes four main recommendations:
 More time is needed for ethics education 
in undergraduate courses and in 
vocational training.
 Ethics education for the legal profession 
needs to embrace a variety of ethical 
theories, including virtue ethics, if students 
are to make sense of the moral nuances 
of being a good lawyer. 
 The contribution of lawyers who are models 
of ethical character, reasoning and action 
need highlighting in the post-qualification 
training and CPD of lawyers, as much as 
those bringing commercial success.
 Greater attention must be given in legal 
practice to the influence of informal learning 
on workplace culture. Senior staff, role 
models and supervisors should work 
together to provide more opportunities 
for reflecting on ethics in their workplace. 
1 For the purposes of this report, the term ‘lawyers’ is used to refer to both solicitors and barristers in the UK.
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1 Purpose of the Report
Being a lawyer is challenging and the challenge 
is career-long. The nature of professional 
practice, and its knowledge, skills and 
understanding, requires not only initial mastery 
but, as professional expectations alter, a 
commitment to lifelong learning. Demanding 
though these commitments are, their integration 
into successful practice requires more. 
It requires creativity and tenacity, so that 
change is appropriately adapted to particular 
circumstances. No profession can thus solely 
rely on a conception of fixed duties. The 
specific duties of lawyers to the justice system 
and their clients will sometimes also require 
bravery, honesty and judgement, especially 
when decisions are needed which a client may 
not welcome. There will also be unpredictable 
and difficult circumstances which, whilst 
drawing upon a lawyer’s knowledge, skills and 
understanding, will also require qualities 
which are of the person, not the role: qualities 
such as humour, a sense of fairness, a capacity 
for empathy, patience and forgiveness, and 
inner resourcefulness. In short, being a lawyer 
calls on the qualities or virtues of individual 
character. This report examines those qualities 
and their place in legal practice.
It does so by drawing upon a virtue ethics 
perspective, thereby complementing the 
more rule-based approach that remains 
influential in legal ethics. Raising awareness 
of the contribution virtue ethics can make to 
the quality of legal practice adds to the debate 
on how best to develop and maintain ethical 
literacy in the profession. Moreover, grounding 
our enquiry in an empirical study provides 
a profile of the extent and scope of character 
and virtue in professional practice that 
complements the theoretical aspects of virtue 
ethics, an approach largely neglected in other 
studies within this field.
The key questions addressed in this 
report include:
 What virtues and values are held by 
lawyers and aspiring lawyers?
 How do personal and professional virtues 
and values shape practice?
 How does the workplace influence 
ethical practice?
 How do lawyers reason when resolving 
ethical dilemmas?
 What are the implications for ethics 
education in the profession?
 How might current changes in the 
regulatory environment influence 
ethical practice?
In answering these questions, we report how 
1st year law undergraduates, those completing 
vocational training (LPC/BPTC students),1 
and experienced solicitors and barristers 
assess their personal virtues, the virtues they 
associate with an ‘ideal’ lawyer and their 
motivation for entering the profession. 
We examine the influence of organisational 
values and expectations on professional 
practice with findings from these two parts 
of the study highlighting how lawyers have 
obligations to their clients, the court, and the 
firms or chambers to which they belong. 
These obligations sometimes create ethical 
tensions and challenges and, through a set 
of dilemmas, we examine the choices our 
respondents make and the reasons they select 
in making those choices. Apparent in these 
dilemmas is that ethical judgements are not 
always resolved by reference to codes of 
conduct, and our analysis examines how virtues, 
codes of conduct, and the consequences 
of actions contribute collectively to decision-
making. Difficult as it is to understand character 
empirically, the evidence and findings from 
these dilemmas add to the overall profile 
of professional practice and, in the context 
of contemporary change, contribute to our 
examination of, and comments on, the place 
of virtues in initial and continuing legal 
education and training. 
This report is timely. The continuing 
implementation of the Legal Services Act 
2007 means it is a time of considerable change 
in the legal profession in England and Wales. 
Legislative and other changes that include 
widening routes of entry into the profession, 
reforms in the education and training of lawyers, 
new legal entities, greater competition, and 
cuts to the Legal Aid budget add to demands 
on the character of individual lawyers and 
present new challenges to sustaining ethical 
practice. Beginning with these changes 
provides a context for the report and, followed 
by an outline of the design of the study, 
we explain how virtue ethics contributes to 
analysing how lawyers respond to ethical 
challenges, and its potential contribution to 
their education and training.
1 Legal Practice Course (LPC) students become solicitors and Bar Professional Training Course (BPTC) students become barristers.
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2 Background
Lawyers are accorded a large measure of 
autonomy in matters within their area of 
expertise, and by using their trained judgement 
they are expected to serve the interests of 
their clients. Moreover, as officers of the court, 
they are required to ‘uphold the rule of law and 
the proper administration of justice’, ‘act with 
integrity’ and ‘behave in a way that maintains 
the trust the public places in [them] and in the 
provision of legal services’ (SRA Handbook, 
2014; Bar Standard Board Handbook, 2014). 
Lawyer autonomy relies on society trusting 
that the advice lawyers give, and the actions 
they take, reflect both their duties to the client 
and the rule of law, above their own self-
interest. While codes of conduct suggest limits 
as to what ought to be done as opposed to 
what can be done, it is the actions and choices 
of individual lawyers that set the boundaries 
of their practice and, therefore, individual 
character and virtues matter. That practice and 
its demands on individuals is complex (Carr, 
2000). It is shaped by the particular institutional 
and socio-economic frameworks, which are 
represented diagrammatically in the design 
of Figure 1.
The ethical practice of individuals, a key 
focus of this report, is placed at the centre of 
Figure 1, along with the organisations within 
which they practice. In addition, education 
and training are highlighted in the diagram as 
they also play an important role in this report. 
Changes in other parts of the legal services 
sector shown in Figure 1 are considered briefly 
in the next section to illustrate how professional 
practice and the changes occurring in the 
sector all have implications for professional 
ethics, raising new questions and challenges 
for virtuous practice. 
2.1. CONTEMPORARY CHANGE
The Legal Services Act 2007 (the ‘Act’) 
re-configures the policy context for legal 
services in England and Wales. Following 
the recommendations of the Clementi Report 
(Clementi, 2004) to liberalise the market for 
legal services, the purpose of the Act is 
‘to put the consumer first’ (Department of 
Constitutional Affairs, 2005). Competition is a 
consistent theme, as it is in changes to funding 
legal aid work (Ministry of Justice, 2013). 
The Act created the Legal Services Board 
(LSB), a ‘super-regulator’ responsible for the 
operating context for eight occupation/
profession-specific regulators: the Solicitors’ 
Regulation Authority (SRA), the Bar Standards 
Board (BSB) and six others (Legal Services 
Board, 2014a) who are responsible for meeting 
the eight objectives defined in the Act (Legal 
Services Board, 2014b). Competition is 
regarded by the LSB as pivotal for achieving 
the other objectives because ‘we think the rule 
of law is more secure for a competitive market, 
where it’s transparent’. (Interview with officers 
and representatives of the LSB). Comments 
from experienced lawyers, however, have shown 
concern that a reform agenda overly reliant on 
competition could do long-term harm to the 
quality of legal services and the societal benefits 
that many of the objectives are designed to 
serve (Kenny, McGowan and Mayson, 2014). 
[The regulators] are starting off trying to 
think what makes a good business, before 
they ask, what makes a good person and 
I think they need to start by asking what 
makes a good person and then come 
to what makes a good business person. 
(Solicitor 18)
POLICY 
CONTEXT
REGULATORSEDUCATION AND 
TRAINING
REPRESENTATIVE 
BODIES
RECRUITMENT 
AND ENTRY 
ROUTES
ETHICAL PRACTICE 
IN INDIVIDUALS AND 
ORGANISATIONS
CHANGING 
BOUNDARIES 
OF LEGAL 
PRACTICE
CLIENT ACCESS 
TO JUSTICE
ORGANISATIONAL 
SETTING
Figure 1
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New regulatory bodies mean the Law Society 
and the Bar Council effectively become solely 
representative bodies, and their decisions 
in defining their new roles may tell us something 
about the emphasis they intend to give to 
professional virtues. In an analogy with 
the medical profession, will their model be the 
British Medical Association and its primary 
concerns about terms and conditions of service 
or the medical Royal Colleges and their greater 
emphasis on professional development? 
Competition is intended to re-design legal 
practice on grounds of efficiency. This can 
be positive but it can also have unforeseen 
and unintended consequences. Greater 
fragmentation of work can prevent a holistic 
view of an issue, reducing the ‘opportunity 
to develop a contextual approach to ethical 
thinking’ (Francis, 2005:180). Moreover, 
the increase in the employment of unqualified 
lawyers engaged in legal and quasi-legal 
work increases the numbers of those 
not professionally bound by, or who even 
understand, a lawyer’s obligations to the court.  
The Act allows the creation of new 
organisational settings, Alternative Business 
Structures (ABS), able to provide a broader 
range of services, employing a diversity of 
professionals (Jordans Group, 2014). With 
no requirement for lawyers to head these, 
there is concern whether the ethics of other 
occupations and professions will dominate 
those of the law.
Reflecting its market orientation, the LSB 
statement on regulatory objectives refers to 
consumers rather than clients. Lawyers can be 
influenced by the status of their clients, which 
can range from the needs of a homeless illegal 
immigrant with a young child to corporate 
lawyers negotiating ‘aggressively’ or ‘fiercely’ 
on behalf of their clients. If one case calls for 
kindness and generosity of spirit, the other 
may call for bravery, courage and honesty. For 
large corporate clients, ‘the growing power of 
sophisticated and knowledgeable clients, who 
are repeat players in legal services, removes 
the ‘social distance’ between lawyer and client’ 
(Francis, 2005:183).  
The Act and the LSB are encouraging new 
routes into the profession. Existing routes to 
qualifying as a barrister or solicitor are expensive 
and the social profile of recruitment is an ethical 
issue, as is the influence of gender in the 
workplace (Sommerlad, 2007, 2008). 
With new routes to qualification being largely 
work-based, the workplace is increasingly 
becoming the site where most legal ethics will 
be learned and experienced, and where the 
virtues of good legal practice will be acquired.  
All these changes inform this study’s focus on 
the character and virtues of individuals, their 
workplaces, and the contribution to these from 
initial and continuing education and training.
2.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND 
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION
2.2.1 Legal Ethics and the Renaissance 
of Virtue
Theoretical approaches to legal ethics all 
provide putative means of determining the ‘right 
thing to do’ in any given circumstance, and 
involve assessments of ‘goodness’ or ‘justice’ 
and the need to weigh competing interests, 
such as those to the client as against those 
required for maintaining the integrity of the 
justice system.
The dominant normative theories in legal ethics 
are deontological theories (e.g. Kantian ethics) 
and consequentialist theories (e.g. Benthamite 
utilitarianism). Deontological theories emphasise 
the place of fundamental principles or rules 
which act as means of guiding behaviour and 
which form the basis of assessing whether an 
action is ‘right’. Their application can be seen 
in the use of codes of conduct as the basis 
of compliance systems where the rightness of 
an action is demonstrated by adherence to 
the rules. A weakness of this approach is the 
impossibility of creating codes of conduct which 
are sufficiently detailed to cover every eventuality. 
Similarly, if their form is too general, they provide 
too little guidance. Moreover, such codes may 
indicate to practitioners that compliance with 
formal rules is all that is required of them morally. 
At a more general level, it is philosophically 
difficult to enunciate with any certainty the 
intellectual basis for the adoption of principle-
based regulations. In consequentialist theories, 
the rightness of an action is determined by 
its outcome, which, in terms of Bentham’s 
utilitarianism, is concerned with assessing ‘the 
greatest good for the greatest number’. Among 
its limitations are the practical difficulties of how 
utility is measured and the risk that it supports ‘a 
tyranny of the majority’ (Mill, 1859:ch.1), perhaps 
leading to undue victimisation of individuals. 
Notwithstanding their weaknesses, these ideas 
are influential in legal practice where rules 
and duties have traditionally occupied a 
dominant place in guiding professional conduct. 
More recently, a professional conduct regime 
known as ‘Outcome Focused Regulation’ 
emphasises the need for demonstrating the 
good outcome of an action as means of 
satisfying the regulators that an action was 
acceptable practice. This consequentialist 
approach supplements a rule-based approach, 
reducing a narrow focus on mere compliance 
and preferring an assessment of an action’s 
ultimate consequences. This regulated 
environment provides clients with legal services 
whilst simultaneously safeguarding a duty to 
the court. As these duties sometimes conflict, 
the code is clear that the duty to the court 
(i.e. maintaining the integrity of the legal system) 
is paramount, even though that may, in some 
circumstances, have the consequence of 
overriding a more just alternative.
Where two or more Principles come 
into conflict, the Principle which takes 
precedence is the one which best 
serves the public interest in the particular 
circumstances, especially the public 
interest in the proper administration of 
justice. (SRA Handbook, 2014:2.2)
As lawyers are necessarily skilled in 
considering the consequences and risks 
attached to a course of action, deontology 
and consequentialism will inevitably be part of 
a lawyer’s ethical reasoning. Nevertheless, 
both these normative moral theories neglect 
the moral character of practitioners, both as far 
as the intrinsic worth of good character for the 
well-rounded life of the practitioners themselves 
is concerned, and its more extrinsic impact on 
their dealings with clients and wider society. 
In responding to ethical dilemmas, hypothetical 
or real, virtue ethics provides a third approach 
to their resolution. It is currently gaining greater 
prominence in legal ethics. In its classical 
Aristotelian form it asserts that ‘goodness’, 
‘character’ and ‘virtue’ are central in determining 
the rightness of an action and that an action 
is right if it is what an agent with a virtuous 
character would do in the given circumstances. 
Character consists of the range, variety and 
intensity of virtues possessed by individuals. 
They are the character strengths needed 
to live a life of human flourishing. A virtuous 
person draws upon their virtues when making 
decisions and, by applying phronesis or 
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‘practical wisdom’, acts in ways that ultimately 
may produce a good human life. Phronesis 
is the process of wise discernment between 
competing courses of action. In this way, 
the goodness of the virtuous character ideally 
produces an act which is ‘right’. As with 
deontological and consequentialist theories, 
there are criticisms of a virtue ethics approach 
as it is often perceived as being insufficiently 
clear in helping determine precisely what is the 
‘right’ action. There is doubt that it is possible 
to know accurately what a truly virtuous person 
would do in particular circumstances or, indeed, 
to obtain sufficient clarity over the virtues of 
a truly overall virtuous character.  
While none of these three normative theories 
may alone be sufficient in guiding ethical 
choices in the legal profession, we argue that 
the relative neglect of virtue ethics weakens the 
profession’s capacity in responding to its moral 
role. While professional codes can draw clear 
lines and set enforceable standards, and skilled 
analysis can appraise the consequences of 
different courses of action, there is also a need 
for lawyers to develop and maintain the virtues 
or qualities of character as part of their practice. 
Conventional procedures do not always 
sufficiently articulate what ought to be done 
and, in those instances, qualities of character 
can be crucial. 
Awareness of alternative ethical methods…
promotes a whole-of-situation perspective 
which is both morally liberating and also 
morally responsible. The strength of virtue 
ethics is that it does not have to sweep 
away all other approaches to ethics or 
require lawyers to become slaves to any 
particular ethical method in their decision 
making. (Evans, 2011:71)
The recognition that each of these ethical 
perspectives has a place in moral reasoning 
is reflected in the design of the ethical dilemmas 
included in the present study, while recognising 
that these are not always discrete approaches 
(Evans, 2011; Nussbaum, 1999). As few 
empirical studies in this form exist, especially 
in the UK, we aim at ameliorating a lacuna in 
the literature. 
2.2.2 Virtue Ethics and Instrument Design
Recognition that personal character is a 
factor influencing the moral performance of 
individuals has contributed to the comparatively 
2.3 OVERALL EVALUATIVE GOALS
What are the characteristics of the ‘ideal’ 
lawyer? What are the boundaries of lawyers’ 
ethical conduct? Where and how do they learn 
to work within frameworks which set limits to 
what ought to be done as against what can 
be done? What contribution can virtue ethics 
make to the ethical practice of the law? These 
questions embody the overall evaluative aims of 
this study and define its intended outcomes. 
By examining views on the characteristics 
or virtues of the ‘ideal’ lawyer, the study seeks 
to create a framework that can be used in 
programmes of education and training to explore 
these virtues and their importance for legal 
practice. How participants respond to the ethical 
challenges that they are presented with can aid 
understanding of the choices lawyers and those 
in training make. Perhaps more importantly, 
the reasons for selecting a course of action in a 
dilemma can give insight to the place of virtues, 
rules and consequences in their decisions. 
These too can contribute to an assessment 
of the relative contribution that these ethical 
theories can make to legal education and 
training. Through the workplace survey and the 
interviews, the present study provides evidence 
of the pressures of legal practice and their 
implications for education and training. Drawing 
on this evidence, we can consider how initial 
legal education in ethics can provide suitable 
preparation for practice and also how informal 
learning through workplace practice can 
contribute to a robust sense of ethical purpose. 
Through these several aspects of the study, 
our goal is an exploration of how virtue ethics, 
in combination with appropriate deontological 
and consequentialist theories, can meet the 
challenges of contemporary legal practice. 
recent renaissance of interest in Aristotelean 
virtue ethics (MacIntyre, 1985), with a particular 
resonance in the study of professional ethics. 
These include studies on medicine (Pelligrino 
and Thomasma, 1993), medicine and law 
(Oakley and Cocking, 2001), education (Carr 
and Steutel, 2005), law (Farrely and Solum, 
2007; Francis, 2005) and professional ethics 
in general (Walker and Ivanhoe, 2007). In asking 
what makes a good professional, these studies 
give attention to attributes of the person 
performing professional work rather than features 
of that work, making studies of professionalism 
particularly suited to a virtue approach. This 
notion of character, however, is not only of 
increasing interest to the theoretical or applied 
ethics of the professions. More recently, the 
social scientific study of the professions has also 
witnessed the rise of ‘phronetic social science’ 
where the virtue concept of phronesis is 
employed to explain how knowledge is passed 
on in organisations or how lack of phronesis can 
lead to failures in organisations or programmes 
(Flyvberg, 2001; Flyvberg, Landman and 
Schram, 2012; Moore, 2012). Awareness of 
the influence of organisations and context on 
practice is apparent in the contributions of 
virtue philosophers (MacIntyre, 1985; Annas, 
2011; Beadle and Moore, 2006) and, together 
with our focus on the virtue perspectives of 
individuals, is incorporated in the design of this 
study. We do this by drawing upon an existing 
instrument on virtues and character strengths to 
examine individual, personal and professional 
virtues (Peterson and Seligman, 2004) and an 
existing instrument used on workplace 
characteristics (Eurofound, 2012).
The design also considers how professional 
ethics should be taught (Hamilton and Monson, 
2012; Boon and Webb, 2008). While some 
stress its value (Hamilton and Monson, 2012; 
Floyd, 2009; Hamilton and Monson, 2011; 
Monson and Hamilton, 2011), others are 
doubtful of its benefits and effectiveness 
(Kouchaki, 2013; Cochran, 1996), and how it 
should be assessed is a matter requiring 
considerable further examination (Moorhead et 
al., 2012; Evans, 2011). The responses to 
ethical dilemmas and the reasoning behind them 
are key parts of this study and, while recognising 
that responses are not necessarily a reliable 
guide to behaviour, our analysis considers their 
viability in an approach to ethics in education 
and training.  
‘THE PRINCIPLES OF 
JUSTICE DO NOT CHANGE 
WITH THE CALENDAR.’
D. H. Lawrence
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3 Methodology
We limit this section to a statement on 
overall design and information and 
comments on participants. Other aspects 
of method, including instruments and their 
rationale, modes of quantitative and qualitative 
analysis, study limitations and further 
ethical considerations are available at 
www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/professions
3.1 DESIGN
A cross-sectional design enabled enquiry 
at three career stages: 1st year Law 
undergraduates, students about to finish their 
vocational legal training courses (LPC/BPTC 
students), and experienced professionals, 
composed of solicitors and barristers usually 
with at least five years’ experience of practice. 
Findings for solicitors and barristers are 
normally reported separately but we use 
‘lawyer(s)’ when referring to both groups.  
Table 1 shows the data collected by e-survey 
and interviews. The e-survey had two sections 
where respondents, early in the survey 
document, selected six personal character 
strengths from a list of 24 and, later, from the 
same list of 24, selected six character strengths 
they associated with the ‘ideal’ lawyer. Once a 
section was completed, it was not possible to 
return and alter entries. A further section for 
Solicitors were contacted via the ‘Law Society 
Professional Update’, a weekly email to over 
100,000 solicitors in England and Wales. 
The news item contained a short outline of the 
research and a hyperlink to the on-line survey. 
Barristers were emailed at the work email 
addresses available on the Bar Directory online.  
Approximately 4,100 addresses for a mix of 
London and regionally based barristers were 
selected. All were sent a personalised email 
in letter form; as 6.5% bounced back, the total 
delivered was about 3,800.
Table 2 shows the distribution and response 
rate for the four groups. The majority of 
respondents were female, white British and 
described their religion as Christianity or none.  
(This data is also available on the website).   
While the number of responses for a study 
of this type is acceptable, low response 
rates in all groups except for undergraduates 
means the profile is unlikely to be representative. 
With the exception of undergraduates, it may 
be reasonable to conclude that our respondents 
share an interest in the area of enquiry, a factor 
that is relevant to how we view the analysis. 
As argued later, this is particularly pertinent in 
our analysis of responses to the ethical dilemmas. 
Interviewees were contacted by email or 
telephone if they had indicated a willingness 
to be further involved with the research. 
experienced solicitors was a set of 15 
statements on the workplace and all were 
asked for personal demographics.   
The e-survey also included six ethical 
dilemmas and the second part of Table 1  
shows different modes of analysing responses 
to those dilemmas. Four of the dilemmas draw 
on scenarios first used in a study of Australian 
law students (Evans and Palermo, 2003). 
The dilemmas, which are shown in full in 
Appendix 3, were prepared with advice and 
guidance from an expert panel of legal 
ethicists (see Appendix 1).
The e-survey was complemented by 
interviews with survey respondents who 
had indicated a willingness to be approached 
for interview. In addition, educators and 
regulators were interviewed.
3.2 PARTICIPANTS
Data from undergraduates and LPC/BPTC 
students were gathered at seven sites: the 
Universities of Birmingham, Brighton, Hull, York, 
Glasgow, City University and the University of 
Law. Typically students were contacted by 
email with a link to the survey although, at York 
University and Glasgow University, the survey 
was completed as a cohort in computer suites.
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As with responses to the e-survey, we do 
not claim that they are representative.  
Officials from the Legal Services Board (LSB), 
the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), 
the Law Society (LS), the Bar Council (BC), 
and the Bar Standards Board (BSB) were 
interviewed, as were at least three academics or 
educators from each participating law school. 
All regulators and educators were interviewed 
in person. 
3.3 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The study received ethical approval 
from the University of Birmingham Ethics 
Committee.  We regarded adherence 
to the ethical considerations as essential 
given the fact the research was being carried 
out with practising solicitors and barristers. 
The research participants were fully informed 
of the scope and methods of the research, 
and had the right to withdraw at any time. 
Quotations in the report from the semi-
structured interviews with individual students 
and practitioners are cited using an anonymous 
reference e.g. Solicitor 04. 
Domains of data collection Ethical dilemmas with methods of analysis
Character strengths Choice of actions 
 Self-reported assessment of an individual’s 
six best character strengths 
 Respondent views of the six best character 
strengths of the ‘ideal’ lawyer
 Analysis based on rules, consequences 
or virtues 
 Analysis based on the ranking and 
combinations of reasons 
 Analysis based on self-protective and 
amoral reasoning 
Organisational context 
 Factors in the working or training environment 
Personal narratives
 Interview data; and
 ‘Why I want to be a lawyer’, etc. 
Personal characteristics 
 Age, gender, ethnicity, religious affiliation, etc. 
Table 1: Data Collection and Means of Analysing Dilemmas
Career Stage Distribution Completed Responses (n)
Response 
rate (%) Interviews (n)
1st yr. undergraduates 849 345 40.6 28
LPC/BPTC students 2169 271 12.5 20
Solicitors E-mail newsletter 
to 100,000
177 - 26
Barristers 3,800 150 3.9 20
Educators and 
regulators 
23
Table 2: e-Survey and Interviews
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4 Findings and Discussion
4.1 VIRTUES AND THE INDIVIDUAL LAWYER
This section reports on the findings of the 
e-survey and semi-structured interviews in 
relation to the relationship between virtues and 
individual lawyers. Two areas are analysed: 
motivations for entering the legal profession 
and respondents’ views on character strengths 
and virtues.
4.1.1 The Motivation to Enter the 
Legal Profession
An open question in the e-survey asked 
respondents to reflect on their motivation for 
entering the legal profession. Across the 
sample a wide range of reasons were given 
and thematic analysis coded these into ten 
categories. The percentage of responses falling 
within each category is displayed in Chart 1. 
Of the ten categories, four received higher 
occurrences than the remaining six across all 
four of our respondent groups, and these are:
 Service –helping people, society, the 
administration of justice and the rule of law
 Interest – interesting or enjoyable work 
or subject
 Material benefits – including career, status, 
and money
 Skills – including debating and arguing, 
public speaking, analysis, and problem solving
While these were the four most stated 
motivations across our four respondent groups, 
there are some interesting differences in the 
level of response provided by each group. 
Undergraduates report service and interest 
as key motivational factors to a higher extent 
than material benefits and skills. The distribution 
of responses across the four categories 
reported by LPC/BPTC students was more 
even, with material benefits, skills and service 
slightly more prominent than interest. 
Solicitors most frequently cite service and 
material benefits to a higher extent than interest 
and skills. The motivations of barristers evidence 
that while skills, service, material benefits, 
and interest were important, so too – in contrast 
to the other respondent groups – was 
self-employment and independence.
 
4.1.1.1 Service
Comments on the importance and meanings 
of service demonstrated the importance of 
justice and fairness. One undergraduate 
(Undergraduate 11) elaborated on this 
sentiment in her interview, describing how the 
civil unrest in London during the summer of 
2013 stimulated an interest in crime, human 
rights and youth justice. She had written a 
report on the subject for her school and this 
became a key motivating factor in choosing 
to enrol in a law degree. Others expressed 
concern for fairness and justice in terms 
of possessing a social conscience, a typical 
comment being ‘I have a strong sense 
of justice and a desire to make a difference 
and help people’. These motives are often 
accompanied by a desire to contribute to 
the wider society, a concern for the ‘underdog’ 
and the wish to be the type of lawyer with 
whom people could easily communicate 
(Undergraduate 14).
Chart 1: Motivation to Enter the Legal Profession
For Undergraduates n=538, Graduates n=142, Experienced Solicitors n=194 and Experienced 
Barristers n=316.
KEY:
S – Helping people, society, the administration of justice and the rule of law
I – Interesting or enjoyable work or subject
P – Personality and character strengths suitable for law
M – Material benefits, including career, status, and money
D – Diversity or variety of work or subject
SK – Skills including debating and arguing, public speaking, analysis, and problem solving
F – Family tradition, influence or advice
E – Work experience
SE – Possibility for self-employment and/or independence
OTHER – Includes personal values, the influence of TV programs, and the possibility of teamwork
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4.1.1.2 Interest
The challenges inherent in being a lawyer and 
the extent to which these would provide an 
intellectually stimulating environment were also 
mentioned. Being a legal professional was 
viewed as an opportunity for an interesting and 
varied career, with respondents indicating that 
it would satisfy their intellectual curiosity and 
provide opportunities for creative work. 
Typical comments from the open box question 
in the e-survey include a solicitor who ‘saw it 
as an interesting and valued career’ and a 
barrister explaining that ‘it appeared to be 
an interesting and challenging way to earn a 
good living and one which was less regimented 
than others.’ 
4.1.1.3 Material Benefits
Many respondents recognised the potential 
material and status benefits of being a lawyer 
and stated that these had motivated them to 
enter the legal profession. One respondent 
was candid about this aspect, stating, ‘I won’t 
lie, I like the prestige’ (Undergraduate 06). 
Other undergraduate comments from the open 
box question linked career choice with material 
benefits, ‘I chose law primarily because it is a 
stable profession that earns a good wage and 
has high rates of employment, which I value 
greatly in a society with such high rates of 
unemployment and increasing levels of relative 
poverty’. Another student chose law because 
it could provide ‘interesting, varied work, 
a career with a good reputation and good salary 
prospects’. Status was linked to service as 
illustrated in this comment that being a legal 
professional is ‘a good and respectable thing 
to do and a thing which, you know, people will 
respect you for’ (Solicitor 04).
4.1.1.4 Skills
Respondents cited the ability to develop and 
use a range of skills as motivating factors in 
entering the legal profession. Though much less 
important for undergraduate respondents 
compared to other factors, it was the most 
important factor for the barristers. In the 
semi-structured interview, some respondents 
referred to the influence of their family in 
aligning the skills and attributes of the individual 
with those required for the profession (LPC/
BPTC Student 01).
4.1.2 Character Strengths and Virtues
The e-survey and semi-structured interviews 
asked respondents to consider the character 
strengths and virtues required in the legal 
profession. This involved respondents thinking 
about both their own personal qualities 
and those required to be an ‘ideal’ lawyer. 
From a list of 24 items, respondents were 
asked to identify six items which best 
represented their own personal strengths 
and, later in the survey, six items from the 
same list that represented the ‘ideal’ lawyer.
4.1.2.1 Personal virtues
Table 3 shows fairness, honesty, humour 
and perseverance as the most common 
personal virtues self-reported in all four 
respondent groups. Kindness and curiosity 
completed the six most commonly selected 
personal virtues for undergraduate students, 
while LPC/BPTC respondents identified 
curiosity and teamwork within their six. 
Of note was the finding that judgement 
was identified by both solicitors (whose 
six items also included kindness) and 
barristers (whose six items also included 
love of learning).
4.1.2.2 Virtues of the ‘Ideal’ Lawyer
Table 4 shows the six virtues of the ‘ideal’ 
lawyer most commonly selected by 
respondents. These findings show a greater 
concentration of choices than for personal 
virtues. As with the personal virtues, fairness 
and perseverance were among the most 
identified six virtues across the four groups 
with judgement and perspective also in the 
most identified six virtues for all four groups. 
That undergraduates and LPC/BPTC students 
identified judgement as a leading virtue of 
the ‘ideal’ lawyer but that it was not in the top 
six personal virtues, while solicitors and 
barristers both identified it in their top six 
personal virtues and in the virtues of the ‘ideal’ 
lawyer, suggests that judgement is recognised 
as a central virtue for lawyers but one developed 
in practice rather than possessed at an early 
stage of their careers as legal professionals.
For all groups, the top six items now account 
for a greater percentage of all choices and 
represent 64% and 67% of all choices by 
1st Year 
Undergraduate
%
LPC/BPTC 
students
% Solicitors % Barristers %
The ‘Ideal’ 
Lawyer
Judgement 13 Judgement 12 Judgement 14 Judgement 16
Perseverance 11 Honesty 11 Honesty 14 Honesty 15
Perspective 10 Perseverance 10 Perseverance 10 Perseverance 12
Fairness 9 Teamwork 10 Perspective 10 Fairness 9
Social 
Intelligence
8 Fairness 8 Fairness 10 Bravery 8
Leadership 7 Perspective 8 Teamwork 6 Perspective 7
As % of 
all choices
58 59 64 67
1st Year 
Undergraduate
%
LPC/BPTC 
students
%
Experienced 
solicitors
%
Experienced
barristers
%
Personal 
Virtues
Fairness 8 Fairness 9 Fairness 12 Honesty 12
Honesty 8 Humour 9 Honesty 12 Judgement 12
Perseverance 6 Honesty 8 Humour 7 Fairness 11
Kindness 6 Perseverance 8 Judgement 7 Humour 9
Curiosity 6 Curiosity 6 Perseverance 7 Perseverance 8
Humour 6 Teamwork 6 Kindness 6 Love of 
Learning
5
As % of 
all choices
40 46 51 57
Table 3: ‘Top six’ Personal Virtues
Table 4: ‘Top six’ Virtues of the ‘Ideal’ Lawyer
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An ability to relate to clients was also regarded 
as fundamental. This included being able 
to assess their character, having empathy 
to understand the client’s position, and being 
able to put the interests of clients first. One 
undergraduate had insight into the tensions 
generated between having the qualities 
required to succeed in the profession and 
how this might conflict with the importance 
of integrity in fulfilling the role: ‘I can envisage 
myself maybe not making the wisest decisions 
simply because, you know, I’ve worked so hard 
and I don’t want to be faced with a situation 
and go, ‘Well, just for the sake of my morals 
so that I can feel really good about myself, 
I’m going to make this decision that might 
cost me any job or my pupillage or my career’ 
(Undergraduate 06).
The observations of experienced lawyers 
reflected a holistic view of the legal role, as well 
as its morality. The perspective which came 
through in the interviews recognises that codes 
of conduct alone are not adequate because, 
as one interviewee astutely remarked, ‘if you 
need the code to tell you to act properly and in 
the client’s interests then, frankly, you’re in the 
wrong job’ (Solicitor 04).
Someone who understands the law, finds 
the solutions, who communicates in a user 
friendly way, who thinks up creative things, 
who understands the client’s real concerns 
rather than just the law… morality is going 
to run through like a flavour in an ice-cream. 
(Solicitor 04)
There were moments in the interviews where 
respondents raised critical views. Specific 
mention was made of lawyers giving advice in 
relation to tax laws in a context ‘where 
ethics has gone out of the window because 
you’re manipulating a system and a system 
of rules’ (Solicitor 24). This interview and 
others showed concern about challenges 
and changes in the legal sector, which have 
implications for ethical practice. In addition, 
some respondents in the experienced lawyer 
groups cited the importance of reconciling 
the relationship between personal virtues and 
those expected of the profession. Values at 
the place of work were highlighted by one 
respondent, who argued that law schools 
need to give greater attention to thinking about  
‘how your own values chime with those of the 
institution’ in which you work: ‘I don’t think it 
was a particularly informed choice, I was aware 
that practising law as a career would involve 
argument… but I do sort of look back and I’m 
astonished at the lack of information and 
naivety with which I went into it all. But I think 
as well that [law schools] need to think how 
students are made aware of the fact that doing 
a job does involve thinking about how your  
own values chime with those of the institution 
within which you’re working and that they may 
not always be the same and that can be 
uncomfortable’ (Solicitor 11).
4.1.2.4 Summary
The findings from this part of the survey 
provide reasons to have confidence that 
members of the profession can manage 
the challenges they face. That there is some 
level of consensus on the principal virtues 
associated with the ‘ideal’ lawyer is valuable for 
a coherent professional culture. Nonetheless, 
and as we see in the next section, changes 
in the profession add to existing pressures on 
virtuous practice in the workplace.    
experienced lawyers. There is also greater 
agreement about the top six virtues of 
the ‘ideal’ lawyer than was the case when 
identifying their personal values. This 
is particularly apparent with the choice of 
judgement and honesty by experienced 
lawyers as they were selected as top 
six virtues by 84% of solicitors and 93% of 
barristers. Bravery appears in the top six 
character strengths for an ‘ideal’ lawyer from 
the perspective of barristers, while teamwork 
is valued by solicitors; this difference may reflect 
the nature of their respective roles. Appendix 
2 shows the distribution of all choices.
What stands out from the comparison of the 
self-reported personal virtues and the ideal 
virtues is the greater correlation, across the 
career stages, in the virtues ascribed to the 
‘ideal’ lawyer than in the self-reported virtues.
4.1.2.3 Virtues in Practice
Data from the interviews complements the 
above quantitative data. Across all respondent 
groups, honesty and fairness feature 
prominently in the interviews and are referred 
to as being essential and at the core of the 
lawyer’s role. This is illustrated by one of 
the solicitors we spoke with: ‘I think there is 
a very strong sense of what we stand for 
as professionals and the sense of fair play, 
honesty and integrity’ (Solicitor 26).
The key thing must be being honest. 
No one wants to see lawyers helping 
bad people getting away from punishment. 
Secondly, integrity, because lawyers know 
more about legal things than the client and 
they can control when decisions are made. 
(LPC/BPTC Student 05)
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One of the barristers quoted here recognised 
the risk that instructing solicitors might 
not send work to them again, and that this 
was a necessary risk involved in complying 
with their duty to the court. A further 
observation was of a rather different risk from 
non-declaration – that of being caught out and 
the associated risk to professional reputation 
‘if you’re seen to be sharp in one case that 
will follow you around for the rest of your life’ 
(Barrister 08).
4.2.1.3 Autonomy and the Client
Clients can influence lawyers. While respondents 
were doubtful that this had become more 
forceful or unreasonable, they recognised that 
dealing with difficult clients still required a range 
of virtuous behaviour including judgement, 
perspective and social intelligence. Client 
pressure can lead to a lawyer losing a client 
because of a professional conduct issue. 
Reflecting on such a situation a solicitor 
stressed the paramount importance of integrity 
and that: 
The profitability of your firm and your loyalty 
to your firm can only be secondary to 
professional conduct and ethical issues. 
(Solicitor 09)
Financial pressures of a different sort were 
illustrated in relation to cuts in legal aid funding 
where the absence of client power makes 
the need for good judgement and a sense 
of fairness from the lawyer more acute. In one 
case, the client had to stop instructing the 
barrister because of lack of funds, leaving the 
barrister feeling ‘almost responsible for the fact 
that I’m having to charge them money to 
represent them and that they can’t afford to 
keep instructing me’ leading to efforts ‘to help 
clients to find alternative sources of support’ 
(Barrister 16).
Illustrating the pressure on younger members 
of the Bar to secure work, a more experienced 
advocate suggests that defence solicitors 
and the Crown Prosecution Service may also 
wield inappropriate influence.
If you take a view that a plea to a lesser 
offence should be accepted and the Crown 
Prosecution Service say no, it puts you in 
a very difficult position and I think, at the end 
of the day, barristers should in that situation 
say, well, I’m sorry, it’s my judgement… 
I’ve listened to your views, but in fact, my 
judgement is that we should do that, but it’s 
difficult to do that because it may well 
jeopardise any further instructions from that 
particular department. (Barrister 02)
workplace. Where lawyers commented on 
tensions between individuals and the work 
organisation, judgement was cited as a 
prominent character strength that enabled the 
individual to balance their autonomy with their 
role. Bravery was also cited when managing 
and protecting one’s autonomy, albeit with 
support to do so sometimes provided by the 
code of conduct (Solicitor 09).
Tension between justice, fairness and 
finance arose in several comments and moral 
judgements are seen as key in resolving these 
tensions: ‘You do have to be much more 
commercial and competitive minded about it… 
it’s not only to make certain that we do a good 
job from our own professional values, it’s to 
also make certain that we keep our clients and 
keep our firm running’ (Solicitor 14). Anxiety 
was also expressed that current changes in 
the legal sector risk undermining the centrality 
of professional values.
4.2.1.2 Autonomy and Duties to the Court
Respondents spoke about situations in which 
their duties to the court and the law supersede 
those to their clients. A barrister explained 
the following situation: ‘if there was an obscure 
bit of case law that I’d found that changed the 
whole aspect of the case, I would have to raise  
that with my opponent. Your client might be 
unhappy with you for doing so, but ultimately, 
you’ve just got to make clear to them that you 
have various obligations, that’s the law the fact 
that the law is against you is unfortunate, but 
there you are…’ (Barrister 08). How difficult 
duty to the court is for clients to understand 
is illustrated by another example where 
the barrister exhibits fairness, judgement, 
perspective and self-regulation in relation to an 
unopposed application during shipping matter:
There was a relevant authority that was 
directly contrary to his client’s case and, of 
course, he had to draw it to the attention of 
the tribunal, to the absolute dismay and 
horror of the client, who couldn’t understand, 
[laughs], why they lost, when there was 
nobody opposing them. (Barrister 10)
Factor 1: Autonomy
Low autonomy
1.5–2.4
Mid-range
2.5–3.9
High autonomy
4–5
(n=135) % 2.8 33.3 63.8
I am able to influence decisions that are important for my work
I am able to apply my own ideas in my work
I have the feeling of doing useful work
I am motivated to work to the best of my ability
I have the resources to do my work to a standard I believe is right
Table 5: Autonomy in the Workplace
4.2 LAWYERS IN THE WORKPLACE  
The following analysis of the workplace draws 
on a 15-item set of questions in the e-survey 
to solicitors and interviews with solicitors 
and barristers about workplace conditions 
potentially impacting upon good practice. 
A factor analysis of responses identified four 
factors, which we name as Autonomy, 
Constraints, Emotional Involvement and 
Collegiality. Factor scores were calculated by 
summing raw scores corresponding to all items 
loading on the factors respectively, and average 
scores were calculated to retain the scale 
metric, which allows for easier interpretation 
later (DiStefano, Zhu and Mîndrila, 2009). 
The quantitative analysis is supplemented by 
data from interviews.
While the 15 statements do not all directly 
mention virtues, their presence is arguably 
implicit. Thus, to be ‘motivated to work to the 
best of my ability’ requires perseverance and 
self-regulation, and it is difficult to imagine how 
lawyers could influence decisions or effectively 
apply their ideas without drawing upon virtues 
including creativity, judgement, prudence or 
social intelligence. The presence of virtue is 
also explicitly and implicitly apparent in the 
interview comments about the workplace.  
4.2.1 Autonomy
Autonomy is a well-recognised characteristic 
of professional work and its presence 
is attested in the five items in Table 5. 
Aggregated responses to the five statements 
show how solicitors rated their work 
environment on a 5-point scale from ‘never’ 
(1) to ‘always’ (5). Very few respondents 
(2.8%) of respondents indicated a low level 
of autonomy; a significant minority (33.3%) 
indicated a mid-range response and the 
majority (63.8%) reported their level of 
 working autonomy to be high. 
4.2.1.1 Autonomy and Organisation  
In interviews, experienced lawyers give insight 
into the significance of virtues and character 
strengths in relation to autonomy in the 
18 The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues 
your performance, or being concerned 
about the outcome of a case because of its 
implications for a client. These multiple 
meanings may explain the absence of a strong 
and consistent statistical association with a 
single group of other statements and why it 
appears as an independent factor.
Table 7 shows that solicitors reported quite 
high levels of emotional involvement with 
their work. While just under one-fifth report 
low involvement, over a third responded 
with ‘sometimes’ and almost half reported 
high involvement.
Emotional involvement is implicit in feelings 
expressed earlier in the report about the 
importance of fairness and justice. It emerges 
with a solicitor who, as a trainee, observed her 
supervisor behaving inappropriately, ‘tracing a 
signature from another document’ but did not, 
at that time, have the courage or confidence to 
act (Solicitor 15). It also arises in concerns 
about fairness in describing the impact of cuts in 
legal aid funding as ‘horrendous’ (Barrister 16).
4.2.4 Collegiality
Norms of professionalism emphasise 
collaboration and collegiality as against 
hierarchy. Collegiality can mean that junior 
members can expect to be informally 
supported and mentored by senior colleagues. 
The correlations in Table 8 might therefore 
be expected. For example, that ‘help and 
support’ are correlated with being ‘treated fairly’ 
and with feeling ‘at home’ in the workplace. 
While the correlation with being able to 
‘act in the best interests of my clients’ is less 
expected, there is a reasonable association 
with statements on a collegial environment. 
Only a small percentage of respondents (2.2%) 
report collegiality as low. A significant minority 
(40.7%) are in the mid-range, reporting some 
collegiality, and over half (57%) report high 
collegiality. While the traditional concept of 
legal partnerships – where individuals knew and 
trusted one another on a personal basis – 
has been replaced by firms (often very large and 
with highly competitive cultures) reasonable 
levels of collegiality remain. Nonetheless, it may 
be pertinent that comments on collegiality in the 
interviews were made as frequently by barristers 
as solicitors, despite their self-employed status.
Collegiality was sometimes expressed through 
reference to role models, drawing upon the virtue 
of self-regulation and emphasising that morality 
and behaviour is no less important than profit.
I’ve been in a supportive firm… that has 
invested in good people and we’ve always 
4.2.2 Constraints
As the statements in Table 6 are indicative 
of pressures or limitations on professional 
practice, we have labelled the factor as 
‘Constraints’. The results show that just 
over one-third of respondents (37.8%) report 
low levels of constraints, nearly two-thirds 
(60%) a middle level of constraint and only 
a very small percentage (2.2%) report high 
levels of constraint.  
4.2.2.1 Constraints and Organisation
Constraints most frequently mentioned in 
interviews related to financial and business 
pressures, and the anxiety that these are 
impacting on ethics. One solicitor suggested 
that ‘the commercial side and economic side 
have, perhaps, driven people to compromise 
their ethics’ (Solicitor 19). Some felt that 
this concern was particularly significant for 
younger colleagues, for whom the pressures 
could be ‘at the expense of clarity about the 
professional side of life’ (Solicitor 07).
Virtue is not absent from accounts of the 
business constraints, as ensuring the success 
of a business is prudent if individuals are to 
make a living. As one solicitor observed, 
‘You can be the world’s best criminal lawyer… 
but at the end of the day, if you’re not earning 
sufficient fees for your firm, then those are the 
influences that affect you...’ (Solicitor 06; 
Solicitor 14).
Experience is required to manage organisational 
constraints. One respondent put this in terms 
of wishing that earlier on in their career they had 
been firmer in insisting a client stop pursuing 
a hopeless but expensive case (Solicitor 11). 
The same respondent explained how, later, 
working on a divorce case, she came under 
pressure from another lawyer not to be frank 
on a form being ‘filed at the court in relation 
to our… mutual client’s financial assets. And I 
refused to do anything other than put the 
correct information down’ (Solicitor 11).
4.2.2.2. Constraints and Duty to the Court
The duty to the court can require lawyers to 
advise clients that certain options in law may  
not be available in particular circumstances. 
This requires honesty and integrity on the part 
of the lawyer balanced with a sense of prudence 
to ensure the client is retained. As an example, 
a solicitor told of a time when a client seeking 
advice on advertising law stated ‘we like to go 
close to the line’. This created a pressure which 
was managed by a prudent approach from the 
solicitor who advised that the law was clear. In 
this case, the solicitor felt his action ‘absolutely 
aligns with morality because there are lots of laws 
against not telling lies in adverts’ (Solicitor 04). 
 
In the following example, bravery, fairness and 
self-regulation were needed to deal with stress. 
The need to balance personal feelings is also 
raised in this highly personal example where 
a lawyer had to accept their duty to represent 
a client:
When I was a very junior solicitor and my 
firm used to do some – but not a lot – 
of crime, and a man who was black was 
accused of a sexual crime and I didn’t want 
to deal with it. I’d been attacked myself and 
I didn’t want to be defending somebody… 
even though I know he was innocent until 
proven guilty and all that but I just didn’t 
want to do it. But anyway I was told in no 
uncertain terms that he had a right to be 
defended and I was to defend him. And 
then ironically he refused to have me as his 
solicitor because I was female which I 
thought was quite amusing. But anyway so 
I got out of it that way (Solicitor 21).
4.2.2.3 Constraints and the Client
Clients create constraints and their 
management draws upon combinations of 
virtues, such as judgement, social intelligence 
and self-regulation. This is illustrated where 
a client wanted a case pursued while the 
lawyer believed the likelihood of success was 
not high, but where a reasonable compromise 
was available (Solicitor 10).
Prudence would be needed where a lawyer 
may be asked to advise a client on an area with 
which the lawyer may not agree, as in giving 
advice to a tobacco company. One interviewee 
sought to avoid these pressures by selecting 
areas of practice where the potential to 
encounter these types of dilemma could be 
reduced (Solicitor 23).
For barristers, the relationship with solicitors 
has similarities with those of clients (solicitors 
are commonly referred to as ‘professional 
clients’). Social intelligence is becoming more 
important as relationships are increasingly 
sophisticated and occasionally vulnerable to 
abuse or manipulation. One barrister observed 
that ‘a lot of this job is… to do with the soft 
skills, which is kind of cultivating and making 
sure you’re friends with solicitors…’ (Barrister 
03), a view given greater emphasis in the 
comment: ‘Interpersonal skills, without a shadow 
of a doubt. If solicitors like you, if clients like you, 
they ask for you and they use you again, it’s a 
very simple formula’ (Barrister 19).
4.2.3 Emotional Involvement
‘Emotional involvement’ may be interpreted 
variously: as being absorbed or committed to 
the profession, enjoying the work, caring about 
felt that we were able to go and talk, you 
know, for example... ‘I’ve got an ethical 
problem’ and we’ve got good people to 
talk that through with. (Solicitor 04)
Set against this, another solicitor described 
changing work cultures and how law is now 
more competitive, and that ‘people tend to be 
more ruthless’ (Solicitor 15). Size can be a 
limiting factor because ‘you can’t in a group 
of over 2,000 people have the same sort of 
relationships, controls or understanding 
that you can have in a group of 20 or fewer’ 
(Solicitor 07).
Collegiality also means leadership by more 
senior members of Chambers (Barrister 02) 
and kindness in a profession where opponents 
‘will treat you in a reasonable way and respect 
you and that allows you to learn and see how 
they do things better than you and I think that’s 
what you learn actually, doing the job and then 
seeing how other people around you do the job’ 
(Solicitor 09).
Accounts of role models reflected a mixture 
of kindness and teamwork with examples 
including, informal conversations and an open 
door policy ‘that’s all pretty valuable’ (Barrister 
03), access to the judgement of others 
and showing gratitude for this, having the 
opportunity to talk over a problem (Barrister 13). 
It is also the comfort of learning that 
‘no matter how senior, everyone has tricky 
professional ethical issues come up on 
a fairly regular basis and everyone relies 
on colleagues as a sounding board’ 
(Barrister 08).
While our survey shows 63.8% and 57% 
of solicitors reporting traditional professional 
characteristics of autonomy and collegiality 
as high, it leaves a substantial minority selecting 
a mid-range response to those factors. In a 
sector where small partnerships have gradually 
been replaced by more hierarchic organisations, 
this profile is not unexpected. Allied to these 
results, however, are the 60% of solicitors who 
show a mid-range response to the constraints 
factor, an item composed from statements 
relating to requiring ‘that I hide my feelings’, 
‘work involves tasks that are in conflict with 
my personal values’, ‘I experience stress’ 
and ‘at work it is difficult to do the right thing’.  
This empirical evidence of intra-personal 
conflict and tension in the workplace supports 
the views of other commentaries on pressures 
in the sector as well as our interview data, 
perhaps most notably on commercial pressures. 
Evidence of these tensions emphasise the 
importance of lawyers being able to respond 
ethically to these tensions, an aspect we 
examine through the ethical dilemmas in 
the study.
Factor 2: Constraints Low constraint 1.5–2.4 Mid-range 2.5–3.9 High constraint 4–5
(n=135) % 37.8 60 2.2
My work requires that I hide my feelings
My work involves tasks that are in conflict with my personal values
I experience stress
At work it is difficult to do the right thing
I do not have time to do my work to a standard I believe is right
Table 6: Constraints in the Workplace
Factor 3: Emotional 
Involvement
Low involvement 1–2 Mid-range 3 High involvement 4–5
(n=135) % 18.5 36.3 45.2
I am emotionally involved in my work
Table 7: Emotional Involvement in the Workplace
Factor 4: Collegialty Low collegiality 1.5–2.4 Mid-range 2.5–3.9 High collegiality 4–5
(n=135) % 2.2 40.7 57
My colleagues help and support me
I am not treated fairly
I am able to act in the best interests of my clients
I feel ‘at home’ in my workplace
Table 8: Collegiality in the Workplace
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the matter privately. Less familiar with the rules, 
slightly fewer LPC/BPTC students and fewer 
still undergraduates would report. Reasons for 
reporting include acknowledging rules had 
been broken and that it was a proportionate 
and reasonable response (1.1.1 [i.e. Dilemma 
1, Action 1, Reason 1], 1.3.1 and 1.3.5). 
Least commonly selected reasons related to 
vengeance – 1.1.4, ‘the wrong-doer should 
be punished’ – or self-serving, 1.2.4, ‘I wish 
to spare myself the shame’, and 1.3.2, ‘by 
reporting it I will increase my trustworthiness 
and reputation within the firm’.
That 5.4% of respondents opted to keep 
the matter private appears to show personal 
concerns being placed above the duty to 
maintain the rule of law, in circumstances where 
zero tolerance may reasonably be expected. 
Of the 60% who would report the matter to 
the firm, we do not know how many of those 
expect the firm to take the appropriate action 
and report the matter to the regulator. 
Dilemma 2: The Family Holiday
Work-life dilemmas are common to many 
working professionals who strive to balance 
service to clients with family life. That 68% 
of barristers were prepared to miss the flight, 
compared with 29.3% of solicitors, may reflect 
their different status as being self-employed or 
employed, and barristers may also be dictated 
more by court timetables. Equally, students who 
responded included prospective solicitors and 
barristers which may account for their choices, 
and they also have less experience of these 
tensions. Competition for training contracts may 
also influence a willingness to go the ‘extra mile’.
While this choice appears personal and 
immediately contextual, there is a wider question 
of whether the legal sector (as elsewhere) 
makes unjust demands and creates unfair 
expectations on its members. A sector that 
emphasises client service and its revenues and 
profits at the potential expense and breakdown 
of family relationships risks moving from a 
market economy to a ‘market society’ (Sandel, 
2012:10). The challenge of practical wisdom 
here is not for the individual but for firms and 
the culture of the profession.
4.3.2 Maintaining Financial Integrity
Dilemma 3: Rounding-up hours
This scenario emphasises the possible influence 
of organisational context with an instruction to 
round-up billing time to the nearest 100 hours, 
arguably a fraudulent charge on a client. 
The dilemma is resonant of the commercial 
pressures mentioned by some respondents in 
the interviews. The percentage of respondents 
prepared to ‘round-up’ declines with career 
stages, possibly reflecting greater awareness 
of its significance, yet 16.3% of solicitors 
chose the rounding-up option. As barristers 
are not permitted to hold client money on 
account, they had to imagine they were 
employed and 4.7% were prepared to round-up 
as instructed. Among those ‘rounding-up’ the 
main reason across all career stages was, 
‘I have already raised my concerns with 
someone, but they seem to see the issue as 
trivial’ and, secondly, ‘I respect the authority 
of my supervising partner’. As with the ‘Misuse 
of Client Account’ scenario, these reasons 
potentially reflect a means of avoiding a 
necessary and appropriate degree of personal 
responsibility. With respect to the scenario and 
the role of more senior members of a firm, it also 
signals how organisational culture can influence 
the integrity of practice. 
Dilemma 4: Flight to New York
Barristers alone were presented with this 
dilemma and 70.7% would not double charge 
for flight time as double charging was seen 
as unethical and unfair. As the option to double 
charge is not illegal in the UK, there are 
questions about whether the 29.3% who 
would double charge were acting unjustly or 
merely seeking some compensation for the 
inconvenience of flying. Practical wisdom may 
lead to both options appearing to be acceptable. 
This situation could be one where new rules 
are required clearly stating that double charging 
is not allowed, as in some US jurisdictions. 
Alternatively, it may be enough for the virtuous 
lawyer to decide the appropriate practice to fit 
the specific context.
4.3.3 A Duty to the Court
Dilemma 5: The Stolen Goods
Initially taken by students and solicitors, 
barristers later explained that, according to 
the rules of evidence, questions directed 
to a witness must be restricted to matters of 
fact and opinions must not be sought at 
that stage in the trial. It sets the duty not to 
mislead the court against a desire to zealously 
represent the client in circumstances that 
may be seen as contributing to justice. In that 
context, the dilemma is an example where 
a rule of procedure serves the long-term 
interests of justice, preventing the lawyer 
asking a question that might reasonably be 
viewed as a virtuous and just action. It is a 
scenario where the rules protecting the 
integrity of the justice system brush against 
ordinary morality conceived according to 
personal conscience.
4.3 ETHICAL DILEMMAS AND REASONING
The scenarios, choices and reasons 
available to respondents are contained 
in Appendix 3. This section of the report 
discusses the key findings from results 
across the career stages. The dilemmas 
are grouped according to related issues. 
References to individual reasons are 
shown as three numbers in the form: 
dilemma/option/reason.
What choices do lawyers make when 
presented with ethical dilemmas and what is 
their reasoning as they seek their resolution? 
In analysing the choices and reasoning 
represented in the dilemmas in this report, 
we centre our approach on the view that 
achieving and maintaining justice ought to 
be a fundamental part of a lawyer’s decision-
making process. If the law is seen as ‘a good’ 
necessary for human well-being or flourishing, 
then, faced with an ethical dilemma, a good 
lawyer ought to use what Aristotle calls 
‘practical wisdom’ or phronesis, a capacity 
to deliberate sufficiently to achieve justice, 
the most just or excellent decision. We see 
this capacity as fundamental to the deliberative 
and motivational responsiveness of a ‘good’ 
or ‘virtuous’ lawyer. While maintaining the 
rule of law and the credibility of the justice 
system are key duties at the heart of the 
lawyer’s role, a virtuous lawyer should be 
prepared to go further, striving for excellence 
and behaving such that they ‘ought not to 
fulfil the requirements of that role in cases 
where fulfilling those requirements involve 
gross violations of justice’ (Oakley and 
Cocking, 2001:121). Evidence (or lack of it) 
of the desire to achieve justice in this wider 
sense is our key criterion in reflecting upon 
the reasoning shown in our dilemmas2. 
Consequently, in each dilemma we focus 
on those findings that raise questions about 
this conception of justice. Each dilemma is 
followed by a choice of options and, for each 
option, a set of six reasons from which three 
had to be chosen. See Appendix 3 for 
full dilemmas. 
4.3.1 Kinship and Work/life Balance
Dilemma 1: Misuse of Client Account
Drafted before the introduction of the SRA’s 
recent legal practice and financial compliance 
regimes, the choices in this dilemma are 
between the individual’s obligation to report 
to the SRA, pass that obligation onto the firm 
or ignore the rule. One-third, (34.7%) of 
solicitors would report the matter to the SRA, 
59.9% to the firm and 5.4% would deal with 
2   Differences between solicitors and barristers mean that Dilemma 1 was not taken by barristers, as they are not permitted to hold client money.
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divided over the right course of action with 
52.4% reporting the matter and 47.6% 
complying with the client’s request. 
Barristers show a greater tendency not to 
report as do undergraduates and LPC/BPTC 
students. Complying with the confidentiality 
rule was the main reason for following the 
client’s instructions and protecting the children 
was the main reason to report. Our results 
do not show whether those who chose to 
breach the rule did so because they thought 
lawyers had a legal duty to disclose which, 
unlike other professions, is not the case.  
Earlier guidance that ‘there may be 
exceptional circumstances involving children 
where you should consider revealing 
confidential information to an appropriate 
authority’ has been superseded by a new 
regulatory system (SRA, 2007), and individuals 
must make their own judgement. The dilemma 
evident in this scenario was also apparent 
in interviews where exceptions to the rule of 
confidentiality were seen as appropriate, 
sometimes by saying ‘something to the judge 
that’s going to get the judge to think this 
needs to be looked into further’ (Barrister 13) 
or where confidentiality is set aside for 
the protection of children (Solicitor 06; 
Barrister 16).
Those prepared to ask the question 
decreased with career stage from 91.8% of 
undergraduates, 79.1% of LPC/BPTC students 
and 70.1% of solicitors. Despite the rules of 
evidence, 34% of barristers would ask the 
question, suggesting that outside this specific 
area of advocacy, the intuitive reaction is to 
ask the question. 
Among those who would ask the question, 
the reasoning for undergraduates was 
spread across all six while ‘it is for the 
prosecution to prove their case’ (5.1.1) 
that featured highly for LPC/BPTC students 
and solicitors. Reasoning for barristers was 
spread but ‘I am trying to make sure justice 
is done’ (5.1.4) was least favoured. Of those 
who would not ask the question, the main 
two reasons were ‘it is wrong to mislead 
the court’ (5.2.4) and ‘my duties to 
the client do not supersede my duty to 
be honest’ (5.2.5).  
4.3.4 Duties to the Client
Dilemma 6: Divorce and Children Act Matter
A genuine concern about child protection 
creates a dilemma where ‘avoiding gross 
violations of justice’ (Oakley and Cocking, 
2001:121) requires the lawyer to break their 
duty of confidentiality to the client. Solicitors are 
Dilemma 7: The HIV-Positive Client
Confidentiality is also central in this scenario 
but, unlike the dilemma concerning the 
Divorce and Children Act matter, rule-
compliance was overwhelmingly the preferred 
option. Where the risk to health relates to 
legally competent adults with no vulnerable 
children involved, is it judged that, where there 
is no gross violation of justice, the credibility of 
the justice system must be protected? If that 
is so, are the 12% of solicitors and 5% of 
barristers who would breach confidentiality 
acting improperly or is it a legitimate difference 
of judgement? In this dilemma, the reasoning 
for each option for solicitors and barristers 
show high levels of agreement. Figure 2 shows 
the ranking of reasons by those who would 
do nothing, and Figure 3 those who would 
breach the rule. Presenting the reasoning in this 
way alludes to the kind of analysis that will be 
possible for all the dilemmas in the future.  
4.3.5 Ethical Dilemmas and 
Professional Formation
Expectations that most respondents would 
choose appropriately just options and make 
suitably just selections from the list of reasons 
provided has, with some caveats, proven to 
be the case. There are a number of possible 
reasons for this outcome.  
There is no compelling evidence to suggest 
that the majority of lawyers do not behave 
appropriately and dutifully in their professional 
role, so that sensible responses to dilemmas 
are to be expected. We also have to recognise 
that those who responded to the survey were 
interested in the topic and this would skew 
the results. Third, a study about character and 
virtues does signal the focus of enquiry and, 
fourth, the reasons provided were balanced 
towards positive reasons.
Despite these factors contributing to a positive 
outcome and, indeed, because of them, there 
are results that raise concerns. That 5% of 
experienced solicitors would have kept the 
matter private in the ‘Misuse of Client Account’ 
scenario shows that rules and compliance 
regimes are not enough on their own to ensure 
virtuous behaviour. The ‘rounding-up’ dilemma 
where 16% of experienced solicitors would 
accept guidance from a more senior colleague 
when it might be regarded as fraudulent raises 
ethical questions about organisational cultures.  
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Figure 2
DILEMMA 7 OPTION 1 - SOLICITORS
DILEMMA 7 OPTION 2 - SOLICITORS
1st reason chosen 2nd reason chosen 3rd reason chosen
DILEMMA 7 OPTION 1 - BARRISTERS
DILEMMA 7 OPTION 2 - BARRISTERS
Figure 3
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4.4 ETHICS, VIRTUES AND EDUCATION 
AND TRAINING
That ‘teaching and maintenance of 
professional ethics and values’ is ‘central to 
the assurance of integrity in the administration 
of justice and quality across the entire legal 
services sector’ is a key message of the recent 
Training Review (LETR, 2013) and is evident 
in our interview data. What this means in 
terms of education and training in ethics 
and virtues is considered here.
4.4.1 Continuity and Change
Contemporary changes in the legal sector 
add weight to the long-standing view that 
understanding ethical expectations is an 
essential element of learning to be a lawyer. 
The implications of the 2007 Act, cuts in legal 
aid, the re-design of roles and the place of non-
lawyers in the sector (Boon and Webb, 2010) 
create new contexts and demands where 
unfamiliar ethical challenges are likely (Duncan, 
2010a, 2012; Flood, 2011). The size and 
power of international law firms who negotiate 
tailored training for their staff adds to their 
influence in shaping ‘values, practices and 
ethics’ and their global role re-defines their 
relationship with national regulators with ‘new 
transnational models of professional culture, 
practice and organisation’ (Faulconbridge 
and Muzio, 2009:1358), having implications 
for shaping ethical practice in different 
jurisdictions (Flood, 2010).  
These issues co-exist with concerns 
evident in interviews about the limited 
attention given to professional ethics in 
education and training. This was described 
by one interviewee as a lack of preparedness 
(Solicitor 02), and echoed in concerns 
about commercial pressures, whether to 
‘record their time generously’ (Solicitor 16; 
Solicitor 21).
Referring to recent changes, a barrister 
expressed concern with direct access 
in terms of ethical risk, valuing solicitors as 
providing distance from the client, so that 
‘I can take a more objective view of their 
case and see how it will be presented’ 
(Barrister 8). The same interviewee suggested 
that colleagues involved in direct access 
might be making mistakes because of 
unfamiliarity with appropriate conduct. 
This view is similar to that of a solicitor who 
believed that inappropriate ethical practice 
often arose from failure to recognise the risk.
I think, apart from those who are crooks, 
most people get into trouble with ethics 
by not having realised that they are facing 
an ethical decision, not analysing it, 
not detecting a problem. (Solicitor 03)
These views add force to giving greater attention 
to ethics in initial and continuing education. 
It is not that there are many lawyers who are 
predisposed to poor ethical behaviour, but 
that they may not have enough opportunities 
to consider them. Indeed, one educator 
commented that ‘there are very few examples 
of students who have taken a very poor ethical 
approach’ (Law Edr 06). Whether educators 
or role models (lecturers, supervisors, 
line-managers or CPD trainers, etc.) are 
themselves well prepared, is captured in one 
frank observation by a lecturer:
I’m struggling all the way through this with 
character strengths, personal qualities, 
which might say something about how little 
time I spend conceptualising them as I 
develop my teaching, which is, in itself, 
important to you, I think. (Law Edr 16)
Agreement on the importance of ethics 
education leaves open the issue on its content.
4.4.2 Codes, Context and Philosophy
Legal ethics teaching in many countries is 
‘often restricted to code compliance’ (Duncan, 
2010b) and, for some critics, means that 
lawyers have too little ‘opportunity to develop a 
contextual approach to ethical thinking’ (Francis, 
2005). The pervasiveness of codes of conduct 
as the basis of ethics teaching is evident in our 
interviews. Their value included recognising 
that a lawyer’s duty was to the court as well as 
the client (Solicitor 15), that its importance was 
emphasised by frequent reference during the 
vocational training course (LPC/BPTC Student 
7; LPC/BPTC Student 13) and that it embodied 
the message of the inter-dependence of the 
person and the professional.
When you’re a lawyer, your conduct in your 
everyday life is important as well as your 
conduct in your job and the code of conduct 
covers your personal conduct in some ways 
as well. (LPC/BPTC Student 20)
A weakness was that codes were sometimes 
introduced without sufficient opportunity ‘for any 
kind of moral discussion’ and consideration of 
‘why the profession has these rules’. (LPC/
BPTC Student 13) Some comments seemed 
also to risk a too-narrow conception of conduct 
and professionalism when one educator 
spoke at some length about appearance and 
punctuality (Law Edr 08) and another asserted:
What we are trying to do here is to educate 
the students to the level that says ‘here are 
the rules, if you’re making any business 
decision you must be aware of those rules, 
you must take account of those rules, 
because if you break those rules you will 
end up in trouble. (Law Edr 13)
A more fundamental criticism was the view 
that one set of codes did not meet the diversity 
of the profession.
You’ve got to behave differently towards 
different types of client and different types of 
person... and I don’t think it’s possible to 
capture that kind of thing in any sort of 
system of rules or code of conduct. 
(Solicitor 11)
This comment leads into the importance of 
context and the place and function of law in 
the wider world. While recognising that some 
LPC/BPTC students were reluctant to do so, 
one of their tutors suggested they should 
be encouraged to expand their thinking into 
intellectual areas that might ‘develop their 
own awareness of what’s happening in the 
broader world’ (Law Edr 02). Humanity in the 
law was illustrated by an example from LPC/
BPTC tutors which highlighted different 
views on relationships.
My colleagues on the family team in the past 
years have had difficulties in some classes 
because in one of the family fact patterns, 
the estranged father of the children has 
entered into a homosexual relationship and 
there have been students who have [said] 
blatantly that’s wrong, he shouldn’t be 
allowed to have the children. (Law Edr 09) 
Opportunities created here to examine issues 
of ‘what’s right, what’s wrong, what’s accepted, 
what isn’t accepted’ (Law Edr 09) is part 
of a wider debate which locates legal education 
in a higher education tradition ‘that emphasises 
a commitment to civic engagement, to (applied) 
philosophical enquiry…’ (Webb, 2009). It also 
recognises the argument that ‘judges and 
practitioners ignore the wider context…at their 
peril’ (Hale, 2013:14) and need to understand 
the ‘law in action’. Values are needed to 
decide which harms the law should aim to 
deal with and good sense and ‘socio-legal 
analysis is needed to identify the best way of 
dealing with whatever harms are prioritised’ 
(Sanders, 2014).
Gaining practice-based experience through 
activities like pro bono volunteering for law 
clinics and mooting were largely welcomed by 
students and can be influential in their choice 
of practice area. One student commented, ‘I 
did a lot of pro bono work at university, looking 
at the social side of law... although I found the 
work interesting, I found the work a bit too 
emotional for my sort of professional capacities, 
so that sort of influenced my choices sort of 
corporate/commercial law’ (LPC/BPTC 
student 09). Another student highlighted the 
need for proper systems to support those 
involved in law clinics (LPC/BPTC student 03).
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The proposition that different disciplines and 
sub-disciplines can contribute to appropriate 
education in legal ethics is consistent with a 
wider ‘moral mission of educating “total jurists”’ 
(Pue, 2006:18). These perspectives are critical 
of technocratic approaches to legal education 
that implicitly see rule-based and cognitive 
methods as sufficient for developing students’ 
moral character (Nicholson, 2009). Moreover, 
greater attention to values are seen as ‘powerful 
motivating and aspirational constructs’ 
(Burridge and Webb, 2007; Webb, 2009) 
and that legal education can be reimagined by 
‘pairing our developing understanding of 
professional identity with an understanding of 
practical wisdom’ and answering ‘the question 
of why it is important that our students develop 
ethical professional identities’ (Floyd, 
2013:225). These and other calls for greater 
attention to legal ethics (Evans, 2014) appear 
in our interviews, a tutor proposing that ‘all 
would-be lawyers should have some kind of 
ethical education which is formal [but]… I don’t 
think many do’ (Law Edr 07).
The limited time given to considering legal 
ethics in teaching and, where it occurs, the 
predominance of codes of conduct leads to the 
issue of how lawyers learn the ethics of practice.
4.4.3 Formal and Informal Learning
Consistent with studies of other professions 
(Eraut, 2007; Jensen, 2007), the workplace is 
an important place of learning where the relative 
emphasis on commercial behaviour in what 
constitutes being a lawyer is worked out in 
practice (Bradney, 2011) and, at worse, as one 
US law tutor and former practitioner tells his 
students, ‘you’ll stop even noticing that 
lying and cheating have become part of your 
everyday practice’ (Schwartz and Sharpe, 
2010:215).  
The workplace is where learning occurs 
by doing, watching and asking questions 
(Undergraduate 19) and ‘nothing quite prepares 
you for law like actually working in a solicitor’s 
office’ (Solicitor 6). The importance of the firm 
is evident: ‘You learn about your ethics [in the 
workplace], as long as you’ve got a good training 
institution, the firm that you’re at is a good firm, 
they will teach you’ (Solicitor 9) as will the 
character of colleagues (Solicitor 15). Formal 
and effective aspects of workplace learning 
mentioned were supervisors and mentors 
(Solicitor 09; Solicitor,11) but it was suggested 
that they lack status within the workplace.
I would make the supervisory role a higher 
status… to be the example… to have the 
time to sit down with your junior lawyer and 
say wait a minute, step back from this, what 
do you think you are doing here, what is the 
point of these instructions? (Solicitor 08)
More formal opportunities for considering 
ethics, such as courses and seminars, were 
often criticised (Barrister 17) with scenarios 
and role-play viewed more positively (Barrister 
08; Solicitor 11) and compared favourably with 
sessions based too unimaginatively on the 
code of conduct (Solicitor 14). 
In pre-qualifying education, undergraduates 
and LPC/BPTC students, commenting on how 
their courses contributed to developing their 
understanding of legal ethics, were also likely 
to mention less formal and extra-curricular 
opportunities as valuable (pro bono, moots and 
scenarios) (Solicitor 26).
This does suggest the potential for using 
case studies and scenarios examining ethical 
dilemmas which are set in value-based 
discussions of their socio-legal context. 
Empirical studies of professional ethics in law 
have been conducted infrequently over the 
decades (Carlin, 1962; Fortnay, 2005; Kirkland, 
2005; Zemans, 1981) and their emphasis on 
case studies of ethical misconduct are one, 
perhaps too narrow, source of material. There is 
also the influence of moral psychology on 
professional formation and ethical behaviour 
(Hamilton, 2008; Hamilton and Monson, 
2011; Hamilton and Monson, 2012; Monson 
and Hamilton, 2011; Cunningham, 2008; 
Cunningham and Alexander, 2010; Mercer, 
Wilkinson and Strong, 1996).  
There is no agreed method of how to 
understand the moral character of lawyers 
and limited work on assessment (Evans, 2011; 
Evans and Palermo, 2003; Moorhead, et al., 
2012). This might be viewed as an opportunity 
to explore different methods from different 
perspectives on what should be included 
in such education. It is apparent, therefore, 
that such initiatives are needed. 
4.5 OVERALL FINDINGS
To conclude this section, we provide a list 
of what we consider to be the most significant 
findings of our project:
 In selecting six strengths expected in 
the ‘ideal’ lawyer, all four respondent 
groups chose judgement, perseverance, 
perspective and fairness. Judgement and 
honesty were selected by 84% of solicitors 
and 93% of barristers. Fairness and 
perseverance appeared in the top six 
choices for respondents selecting both 
ideal qualities and personal qualities.  
 Morality was viewed by the majority of 
respondents as being at the core of being 
a good lawyer. However, some respondents 
expressed concerns about moral standards 
with specific mention of tax law as an area 
where the nature of professional advice 
frequently required manipulation of the 
law and diverged from the expectations of 
ordinary morality.
 60% of solicitors surveyed answered 
‘sometimes’ to statements including ‘my 
work requires that I hide my feelings’, 
‘my work involves tasks that are in conflict 
with my personal values’ and ‘at work it 
is difficult to do the right thing’. Commercial 
factors were most frequently cited pressures 
but the positive influence of good role 
models was apparent. These findings 
indicate some constraints and anxieties 
about the maintenance of a virtuous 
character in the practice of law. 
 The majority of lawyers appeared to 
react appropriately and dutifully in their 
professional roles. Despite this, there are 
responses to ethical dilemmas which raise 
concerns. A dilemma on misuse of client 
accounts showed 5% of experienced 
solicitors would not have reported the 
action. A dilemma on ‘rounding-up’ ‘billing’ 
hours showed 16% of experienced solicitors 
prepared to accept guidance from a more 
senior colleague, even though it might 
be regarded as fraudulent. 
 Ethics education receives little attention 
in the curricula for undergraduate law 
students. At the vocational stage, ethics 
focuses narrowly on the application of 
professional codes of conduct.
 The data from the surveys and interviews 
confirm the research team’s normative 
assumption that virtue ethics, with other 
ethical perspectives, provides a useful 
theoretical lens through which to explore 
the ethics of legal practice.  
‘KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT 
JUSTICE OUGHT TO BE 
CALLED CUNNING 
RATHER THAN WISDOM.’
Plato
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6 Recommendations
As shown by the evidence from this study, 
the large majority of lawyers honour ‘good law’ 
(Tawney, 1921:108) and virtuous legal practice. 
Doing so, however, can sometimes challenge 
members of this majority, let alone those who fail 
to meet their moral and ethical responsibilities. 
These challenges and potential failures relate 
to individual preparedness, organisational 
influences and systemic change – and they call 
for a number of recommendations, which are 
specified below. 
Individual preparedness in formal training largely 
relies on codes of conduct that inevitably fail to 
cover all eventualities. A broader perspective on 
legal ethics and what constitutes ‘good law’ 
can, therefore, contribute to re-thinking the 
content of undergraduate degrees.
 The high standard of intellectual ability 
required to practice law should also be 
applied more vigorously and extensively in 
analysing and reflecting upon ethical and 
virtuous practice in the law. Initial education 
and training needs to find ways to sustain 
and develop motivations relating to justice 
and fairness so that they become embodied 
in professional life. 
 Undergraduate courses on ethics can be 
exciting and innovative opportunities for 
study. Consideration of ethical principles 
and the virtues of ‘good law’ can help 
embed a broad conception of what the law 
means. Our interviews suggest that pro 
bono voluntary law clinics, moots and other 
opportunities to gain practice-like experience 
constitute important means of encouraging 
reflection on virtue principles and should be 
actively incorporated into the formal design 
of undergraduate education in law.
 Many law undergraduates have had no 
opportunity to observe legal practice at 
first hand and some experienced lawyers 
commented negatively on how practice 
was unlike anything they had anticipated. 
Law Schools should do more to help 
students make an informed choice about 
the area of law they may wish to practise, 
so that their career path is better matched 
to their ethical preferences.
 Earlier and greater emphasis on the wider 
ethical context of legal practice can better 
prepare individuals for the pressures of the 
workplace. As a crucible for shaping ethical 
behaviour and sentiment, local communities 
of professional practice are often viewed as 
more influential than compliance systems. 
Initial training is brief compared with the 
career-long influence of the workplace and, 
if the culture is skewed towards commercial 
reward and over-zealous pursuit of a ‘good 
result for the client’ (Joy, 2013:405), ‘good 
law’ can become dubiously re-defined.  
 Law firms, chambers and those responsible 
for systems, management and risk need 
to be aware of the influence of their 
organisation on ethical practice. Senior 
lawyers who share their ‘tricky professional 
ethical issues’ (Barrister 08) or senior 
partners who talk about behaviour being 
‘just as important as the profit element’ 
(Solicitor 12) provide models of ethical 
character, whose contribution to the ethos 
of the organisation should be highlighted as 
much, if not more, as those making the 
biggest deals. Such role modelling and the 
ways it can improve business culture and 
ethos should be supported throughout 
firms with those responsible for training 
embedding goals of positive professional 
behaviour in training programmes.  
 Supervisors of trainees or lead roles in 
informal workplace learning have less status 
than their role requires, and they should be 
exemplars of best practice. Working with 
senior role models, they provide an important 
route to creating opportunities for reflecting 
on ethics and practicing ethically. The status 
of such supervisors must be enhanced.
The systemic change introduced by 
the 2007 Legal Services Act adds to 
competitive pressures in a profession where 
there is doubt that the market is actually 
failing (Lee, 2010). Replacing ‘client’ with 
‘consumer’ re-frames the expert-client 
relationship dependent on integrity and 
trust as an exchange relationship in the 
market. While competition can certainly aid 
accountability and contribute to professional 
standards, we are not persuaded that it is 
‘the most effective way to deliver all the 
regulatory objectives’ (from an Interview 
with officers and representatives of the 
LSB). We share Mark Carney’s concern 
that markets and competition as an 
all-purpose solution means ‘belief in the 
power of  the market enters the realm of 
faith’ (Carney, 2014:3). 
 Unbalanced promotion of competition 
carries dangers for the legal sector and 
can risk its standards of ethical practice. 
Implementation of the components of the 
2007 Act needs to be accompanied by 
debate about their ethical implications, so 
that change can be managed without 
damaging justice. Competition needs to 
be secured without price and exchange 
becoming the basis of values.  
 A market society can lead to the 
commodification of legal services and be 
destructive of legal ethics. Worse than 
removing the personal and relational 
dimension to lawyer-client relations, 
however, is allowing price, competition and 
deal-making to be the principal tests of 
success. This can alter the character of a 
profession, a message so recently provided 
by the banking sector (Llewellyn, et al., 
2014). The evidence of this study suggests 
there is no immediate risk of this occurring 
in the legal services sector. There is a need 
to ensure, however, that all its members and 
organisations have a firm commitment to, 
and a clear understanding of, virtuous 
practice and that education and training and 
organisational and professional cultures act 
together to sustain ‘good law’.
‘IT IS THE SPIRIT 
AND NOT THE FORM 
OF LAW THAT KEEPS 
JUSTICE ALIVE. ‘
Earl Warren 
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‘IT IS IN JUSTICE THAT 
THE ORDERING OF 
SOCIETY IS CENTRED.’
Aristotle 
Appendices
Appendix 1: 
Members of the Expert Panel
Members of the expert panel that devised and amended 
the e-survey ethical dilemmas:
ANDY BOON 
 
Professor of Law at The City Law School, 
City University, London. 
NIGEL DUNCAN
Professor of Legal Education at The City Law 
School, City University, London.  
RICHARD MOORHEAD
 
Professor of Law and Professional Ethics at 
University College London and Director of the 
Centre for Ethics and Law.
SHEELAGH MCGUINNESS 
University Fellow based in the Centre for 
Health Law, Science Policy at University of 
Birmingham Law School.
JYOTI AHUJA  
 
Postgraduate Teaching Assistant, University 
of Birmingham Law School and Chartered 
Psychologist. 
JULIAN LONBAY 
Senior Lecturer, Law, University of Birmingham.
PAUL MAHARG 
Professor of Law at the Australian National 
University College of Law and previously 
Professor of Legal Education at Northumbria 
Law School.
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Appendix 2: 
Self-Reported Personal Character Strengths
The top 6 most selected virtues are highlighted in GREEN
Virtues that 2% or fewer people selected are highlighted in PURPLE
Virtue Undergraduates LPC/BPTC students Solicitors Barristers
Appreciation of beauty 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Bravery 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Creativity 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
Curiosity 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.03
Fairness 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.11
Forgiveness 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
Gratitude 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
Honesty 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.12
Hope 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01
Humour 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.09
Judgement 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.12
Kindness 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05
Leadership 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04
Love 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Love of Learning 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05
Modesty 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Perseverance 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08
Perspective 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
Prudence 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Self-regulation 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
Social intelligence 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04
Spirituality 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Teamwork 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.01
Zest 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
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Appendix 2: 
Self-Reported ‘Ideal’ Lawyer Character Strengths
The top 6 most selected virtues are highlighted in GREEN
Virtues that 2% or fewer people selected are highlighted in PURPLE
Virtue Undergraduates LPC/BPTC students Solicitors Barristers
Appreciation of beauty 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Bravery 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.08
Creativity 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
Curiosity 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03
Fairness 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.09
Forgiveness 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Gratitude 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Honesty 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.15
Hope 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Humour 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Judgement 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.16
Kindness 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Leadership 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.03
Love 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Love of Learning 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04
Modesty 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Perseverance 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.12
Perspective 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.07
Prudence 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02
Self-regulation 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05
Social intelligence 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.03
Spirituality 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Teamwork 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.02
Zest 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
‘JUSTICE CONSISTS NOT IN BEING NEUTRAL 
BETWEEN RIGHT AND WRONG, BUT IN 
FINDING OUT THE RIGHT AND UPHOLDING 
IT, WHEREVER FOUND, AGAINST THE WRONG.’ 
Theodore Roosevelt 
Appendix 3: 
Ethical Dilemmas from the e-Survey
DILEMMA 1: 
CLIENT ACCOUNT SCENARIO
You are a Partner in a firm of solicitors. Your nephew (the son 
of your elder sister) is an associate in the firm. You discover your 
nephew has a significant gambling problem and has taken money 
from the firm’s client account to cover his debts. Fortunately you 
discover the problem in its early stages.
Your nephew is now undergoing counselling for his gambling 
addiction and your sister is hopeful for his recovery. The amount 
missing from the client account is modest and you are certain 
could be reimbursed without attracting any attention.
You have doubts about whether, if you report this matter to 
the firm, they will report it to the Solicitors’ Regulation Authority (SRA).
1 Report the matter to the SRA
2 Keep the matter private and deal with it yourself
3 Report the matter to the firm and leave it to them
OPTIONS:
THESE CHARTS SHOW THE PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO CHOSE EACH OPTION:
REASONS:
30 The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues 
1ST YEAR UNDERGRADUATES
n = 342 n = 283 n = 147
LPC / BPTC STUDENTS SOLICITORS
OPTION 1 OPTION 2 OPTION 3
1 Your nephew broke the rules. You wish to spare your nephew and 
your family the shame.
It is a proportionate and reasonable 
response.
2 You are afraid your nephew may do 
something similar in the future.
Your nephew is already taking steps to 
right the wrong.
By reporting it, you will increase your 
trustworthiness and reputation with 
the firm.
3 If you do not report it, you could land in 
trouble.
You have to be loyal to your family. You have to be loyal to your firm.
4 The wrong-doer should be punished. You wish to spare yourself the shame. It is unfair to the client to sweep this 
under the carpet.
5 You have to be loyal to the client. It is important to give your young nephew 
a second chance.
Your nephew has breached the rules 
regarding trust accounts.
6 You are not confident that your firm would 
report it to the SRA.
No harm was done. You wish to teach your nephew a lesson 
so as to make him understand the 
seriousness of his offence.
10% 18%
35%
5%
60%
13%
69%
36%54%
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DILEMMA 2: 
FAMILY HOLIDAYS SCENARIO
You are a lawyer working on a complex case for an 
important return client. The long working hours involved are 
causing a lot of pressure at home with your partner and 
your young children. Your partner is beginning to ask what 
you are doing at work so late.
You are due to go on a long-arranged holiday with 
your family. However, the very day that you are due to fly, 
the case takes a turn that demands that you spend a great deal 
of time on legal work for this client. If you decide to perform 
this work, you will miss your flight, that which will further strain 
your familial relationships. 
1 Agree to perform the work and miss the flight.
2
 Pass on the work to a colleague who is less 
 familiar with the case.
OPTIONS:
THESE CHARTS SHOW THE PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO CHOSE EACH OPTION:
REASONS:
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n = 342 n = 272 n = 147 n = 150
1ST YEAR UNDERGRADUATES LPC / BPTC STUDENTS SOLICITORS BARRISTERS
OPTION 1 OPTION 2
1 That this pressing workload clashes with a long-arranged 
family holiday is unfortunate, but as a professional I need to give 
the client the best service regardless of personal circumstances.
I must be loyal to the family.
2 To give my best on this case will maximise the likelihood of 
retaining this important return client.
The harm to my family relationship outweighs the risk to my 
client’s interests.
3 The case is complex, and to leave it to a colleague less familiar 
with it would be a great disservice to my client.
My family should not suffer because of my work.
4 The potential harm to the client’s interests is likely to outweigh 
that coming from the stress to familial relationships.
A promise is a promise.
5 To pass the case to a colleague unfamiliar with it would be 
unfair to both the client and the colleague.
I need a holiday and may not perform the work to the best 
standard.
6 This is what is expected of a lawyer. To miss the holiday would lead to unpleasantness 
with my family.
42%
58% 60%
40%
29% 32%
68%
71%
Appendix 3: 
Ethical Dilemmas from the e-Survey (continued)
DILEMMA 3: 
ROUNDING UP HOURS SCENARIO
You work in a law firm and the partner supervising you gives you 
some files to get ready for ‘costing’. She asks you to total the 
number of hours you have spent on each file. She asks you to 
‘round up’ your hours to the next hundred in each file, saying that, 
on average, clients are happy because the main thing they 
demand is quality work. You know that these clients are more or 
less satisfied with the firm and are unlikely to query the bills. You 
are uncomfortable with rounding up the hours billed to the clients 
and, feeling that your supervisor is not about to debate the issue 
with you, share your concerns with another Partner. He gives you 
a clear indication that he does not want to be troubled with this 
matter, but says ‘if you feel strongly about this, put your concerns 
in writing to me’.
THESE CHARTS SHOW THE PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO CHOSE EACH OPTION:
REASONS:
32 The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues 
1
 Carry out the first partner’s instruction to 
 round up the hours.
2 
Write a letter to the second partner detailing 
 your concerns.
OPTIONS:
n = 342 n = 280 n = 147 n = 150
1ST YEAR UNDERGRADUATES LPC / BPTC STUDENTS SOLICITORS BARRISTERS
OPTION 1 OPTION 2
1 I have already raised my concerns with someone, but they 
seem to see the issue as trivial.
If we round up our hours and someone finds out, this will 
damage the reputation of our firm.
2 If I do not do this, it will harm my relationship with my 
supervising partner.
It is not fair to the client that we round up our hours.
3 I respect the authority of my supervising partner. It is dishonest to round up our hours.
4 Antagonising my supervisor will damage my career. If I round up the hours and someone finds out, this will damage 
my reputation with the firm.
5 I should round up the hours out of loyalty to my employer. It will cost the client more if the firm rounds up the hours 
that it charges.
6 Doing this is common practice in my firm, as the 
Partner explained.
Rounding up our hours constitutes fraud.
69%
31%
60%
25%
16%
5%
95%
84%
DILEMMA 4: 
THE FLIGHT TO NEW YORK SCENARIO
You are a barrister based in London. Today, you are flying 
to New York for an important meeting with Client A, who you 
are representing on a commercial matter. Client A has agreed 
to pay for your return flight including your time spent travelling. 
You have already prepared for the meeting with Client A and 
you decide to use the flight time to work on a different matter 
for Client B.
THIS CHART SHOWS THE PERCENTAGE OF 
RESPONDENTS WHO CHOSE EACH OPTION:
REASONS:
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1 Charge Client A for all the travel time and Client 
 B for time spent on Client B’s work both on a time 
 cost basis at the same rate.
2 Charge Client B for the time spent on Client B’s 
 work and the remainder of the travel time to Client 
 A on a time cost basis.
3 Charge Client B for the time spent on Client B’s 
 work, the remainder of the time to Client A on a time 
 cost basis plus an additional surcharge to Client A 
 for the time spent flying while working for Client B.
OPTIONS:
BARRISTERS
n = 150
25%
71%
4%
OPTION 1 OPTION 2 OPTION 3
1 It is the most efficient use of time. As you are already charging the preparation 
time for the meeting to Client A, it is unfair 
also to charge Client A for the same time 
you are working for Client B.
As you are already charging the preparation 
time for the meeting to Client A, it is unfair 
also to charge Client A for the same time 
you are working for Client B but you should 
nevertheless receive something for the 
inconvenience of flying.
2 Working for Client B during the flight will 
free up more useful time later.
Although Client A has agreed to pay for 
your flight, he would not expect you to 
charge for time spent working on a matter 
for another client.
This allows you to recoup the money Client 
A has already offered to pay for all the travel 
time without also double charging for time 
spent working for Client B.
3 The payment from Client A is merely 
compensation for the inconvenience of 
taking the flight and doesn’t prevent you 
using the time to do something else.
You consider that charging twice for the 
same time is unethical.
If scrutinised, this solution is defensible.
4 It is a good way to earn a double fee for 
the same time.
If Client A discovered you had double 
charged for your time, you may lose the 
client.
By not charging Client A on a time cost 
basis for the time spent on Client B’s 
work, you are able to make the separate 
charge to Client A as compensation for 
taking the flight.
5 Client A would be happy for you to work 
for Client B during the flight.
Dividing the time like this is equitable for 
both clients.
This enables you to make as much money 
as possible while remaining ethical.
6 It is your time and you can use it how 
you like.
You regret not being able to charge Client 
A for all the travel time but this seems to 
be the fairest course of action.
Flying is a hassle and you deserve 
compensation for the inconvenience 
regardless of who you are working for.
Appendix 3: 
Ethical Dilemmas from the e-Survey (continued)
DILEMMA 5: 
THE STOLEN GOODS SCENARIO
You represent a client charged with receiving stolen goods. Your 
client was found by the police with a stolen TV set on the back seat 
of his car. Your client tells you that the reason that the TV was on the 
back seat of his car and not in the boot of the car was that his car 
boot is jammed shut and does not open. You have strong reasons 
for believing that your client did not know that the TV set was stolen 
and is therefore innocent of knowingly receiving stolen goods.
You are appearing before a judge who is severe in his sentencing 
and know that there is only one tactic in your questioning that may 
convince the court that your client is innocent. This is to ask the 
arresting police officer: ‘Tell me officer, if this TV set was stolen, 
why would my client place it on the back seat of his car and not in 
the boot of the car?’
THESE CHARTS SHOW THE PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO CHOSE EACH OPTION:
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1 Ask the police officer that question.
2 Refrain from asking the police officer that question.
OPTIONS:
n = 342 n = 278 n = 147 n = 150
1ST YEAR UNDERGRADUATES LPC / BPTC STUDENTS SOLICITORS BARRISTERS
REASONS:
OPTION 1 OPTION 2
1 It is for the prosecution to prove their case. The client might contradict me in his own evidence and the case 
would be lost.
2 I am doing my job. I do not want to hide the truth; I want to be honest to the court.
3 It is part of an advocate’s skill to ask questions like these. It is unfair to the police officer to ask this question.
4 I am trying to make sure that justice will be done. It is wrong to mislead the court.
5 I have to be loyal to my client and do what is in his best interest. My duties to the clients do not supersede my duty to be honest.
6 I am only asking a question, not actively lying. My reputation may be damaged if it is discovered that I knew 
the client’s car boot was jammed shut.
92%
8%
21%
79%
70%
34%
66%
30%
DILEMMA 6: 
DIVORCE AND CHILDREN ACT MATTER
You represent the mother of three small children in a divorce 
and Children Act matter. Your client has previously shown you some 
old photographs of bruises and marks on the children’s bodies. 
One of the children now has blurred vision.
Your client now claims – unconvincingly, as far as you are concerned 
– that the injuries were inflicted by her new boyfriend and not by 
the children’s father that she was seeking to divorce. Your client 
instructs you to stop all legal proceedings against the father and 
holds that she intends to move with the children back to the father.
You have strong grounds to believe the children will be at risk 
if this happens. You have already counselled your client 
against moving back with the father but she instructs you firmly 
to withdraw proceedings.
THESE CHARTS SHOW THE PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO CHOSE EACH OPTION:
1 Withdraw the proceedings, as instructed.
2 Report the matter to the social services.
OPTIONS:
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n = 342 n = 275 n = 147 n = 150
1ST YEAR UNDERGRADUATES LPC / BPTC STUDENTS SOLICITORS BARRISTERS
REASONS:
OPTION 1 OPTION 2
1 I put my client first and would lose her trust if I did not do so. I have to protect the children.
2 This is none of my business. I should report this so that someone can properly investigate 
the case.
3 My client is best placed to decide what is best for her and 
the children.
I have to protect myself against possible criticism.
4 Getting involved in this will be unpleasant. I could not live with my conscience if something happened to 
these children.
5 The rules state that I should protect my client’s confidentiality. The risk to the children is more important than client 
confidentiality.
6 I should protect my client. Usually, family lawyers will discuss this with Social Services.
89%
11%
27%
73%
48%
36%
64%
52%
Appendix 3: 
Ethical Dilemmas from the e-Survey (continued)
DILEMMA 7: 
THE HIV-POSITIVE CLIENT SCENARIO
You are a family lawyer in a large firm and represent a client, Mrs B, 
in an acrimonious and high-value divorce case. Mrs B arrives at a 
meeting one day clearly distressed and discloses that she has found 
out that her husband, who she is seeking to divorce on the grounds 
of his infidelity, has HIV. She discloses that she is fearful that she 
may have contracted the disease herself, but that she is not sure. 
She ‘cannot face’ telling her new live-in partner, Mr C, of the risk as 
she is afraid he might abandon her. Mr C, also a client of yours, is 
not as wealthy as Mrs B. You urge Mrs B to seek further advice from 
her GP, but she refuses, explaining that she cannot afford this 
‘getting out’, and that she will talk to her GP and her new partner 
about her fears when she ‘is ready’.
THESE CHARTS SHOW THE PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO CHOSE EACH OPTION:
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1 Do nothing.
2 Disclose to Mr C that he is at risk of contracting HIV.
OPTIONS:
n = 342 n = 269 n = 147 n = 150
1ST YEAR UNDERGRADUATES LPC / BPTC STUDENTS SOLICITORS BARRISTERS
REASONS:
OPTION 1 OPTION 2
1 It would be unfair to Mrs B to betray her trust. You wish to protect Mr C from infection.
2 Mrs B is clearly distressed and vulnerable and you want to spare 
her further pain.
You think it is only fair to Mr C to tell him.
3 If you involve yourself too much in this unpleasantness, it will 
create more work for you.
You are afraid it will damage your reputation if someone finds 
out you kept this to yourself.
4 It is a rule of good practice that you should protect your 
client’s privacy.
It is the brave thing to do to tell Mr C.
5 You wish to demonstrate that you look after the firm’s interests 
in keeping this high-value client.
Transmitting HIV is a crime.
6 This is in the long-term interests of everyone concerned. This is in the long-term interests of everyone concerned.
73%
27%
14%
86%
88%
5%
95%
12%
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